Adaptively Secure Partially Non-Interactive Threshold Schnorr Signatures in the AGM

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Abstract. Very recently, Crites et al. (CRYPTO 2025) gave a proof for the full adaptive security of FROST (Komlo and Goldberg, SAC 2020), the state-of-the-art two-round threshold Schnorr signature scheme, which is currently used in real-world applications and is covered by an RFC standard. Their security proof, however, relies on the computational hardness of a new search problem they call "low-dimensional vector representation" (LDVR). In fact, the authors show that hardness of LDVR is necessary for adaptive security of a large class of threshold Schnorr signatures to hold, including FROST and its two-round variants. Given that LDVR is a new assumption and its hardness has not been seriously scrutinized, it remains an open problem whether a two-round threshold Schnorr signature with full adaptive security can be constructed based on more well-established assumptions.

In this paper, we resolve this open problem by presenting ms-FROST. Our scheme is partially non-interactive and supports any $t - 1 < n$ adaptive corruptions, where n is the number of signers and t is the signing threshold. Its security relies on the algebraic one-more discrete logarithm (AOMDL) assumption, the algebraic group model (AGM), and the random oracle model (ROM). Further, it achieves the strongest security notion (TS-UF-4) in the security hierarchy of Bellare et al. (CRYPTO 2022). To justify our use of the algebraic group model, we show an impossibility result: We rule out any black-box algebraic security reduction in the ROM from AOMDL to the adaptive TS-UF-0 security of ms-FROST.

1 Introduction

A (t, n)-threshold signature [Des93] is an interactive type of digital signature where the signing key is shared among a group of n signers, allowing any subset of at least t to jointly generate a signature σ on a message m. On the other hand, no subset of $t-1$ or less signers can create a valid signature. As such, signatures remain unforgeable against an adversary that corrupts up to $t-1$ of these signers. Threshold signatures have recently become a central focus of research, mainly due to their applications to blockchain systems and cryptocurrency wallets. Among the most widely studied constructions are threshold variants of the Schnorr signature [Sch91], a pairing-free scheme with highly efficient verification that is also supported by Bitcoin [Nak08].

Adaptive Security. In their recent call for threshold cryptography [BD22, BP25], the NIST explicitly targets threshold Schnorr signatures with an emphasis on adaptive security. An adaptive adversary can corrupt parties dynamically over the course of the protocol execution, based

on information learned so far. In contrast, a static adversary must declare its corruptions before the protocol's execution. Clearly, the adaptive adversary model is much closer to reality in decentralized settings, where an adversary may selectively corrupt parties over time. As such, many works [Mak22, CKM23, KRT24, BDLR25b] have focused on the design of threshold Schnorr signatures with adaptive security. Very recently, Crites et al. [CKK+25] gave an adaptive security proof for FROST [KG20], the state-of-the-art two-round threshold Schnorr signature scheme, which is currently used in real-world applications and is covered by an RFC standard [CKGW22].

A New Assumption. Their security proof for full adaptive security[7] relies on the algebraic one-more discrete logarithm (AOMDL) assumption [NRS21], the algebraic group model (AGM) [FKL18], the random oracle model (ROM) [BR93], and the computational hardness of a *new* search problem called "low-dimensional vector representation" (LDVR). Further, the authors show that the hardness of the LDVR problem is necessary for adaptive security to hold. Interestingly, the problem is defined over a prime field $\mathbb{Z}_p$ and without reference to any cryptographic group $\mathbb{G}$. But more importantly, the hardness of LDVR has not yet been seriously scrutinized. (We note that Crites and Stewart [CS25] concurrently demonstrated a plausible attack on the adaptive security of a large class of threshold Schnorr signature schemes, including FROST and all its variants [BCK+22, RRJ+22, CGRS23]. In particular, hardness of a new problem called "P" is necessary for adaptive security of these schemes to hold. The LDVR problem can be seen as a more restricted form of the P problem.) In particular, to date there exists no fully adaptively secure (stateless) two-round threshold Schnorr signature based on more well-established assumptions.[8]

1.1 Our Contributions

Motivated by the above discussion, we present ms-FROST, a two-round threshold Schnorr signature scheme with full adaptive security. Our scheme is partially non-interactive and supports any $t-1 < n$ adaptive corruptions, where n is the number of signers and t is the signing threshold. Its security relies on the AOMDL assumption, the AGM, and the ROM. Further, it achieves the strongest security notion (TS-UF-4) in the security hierarchy of Bellare et al. [BCK+22].

We achieve our construction from a careful (non-trivial) application of the one-time masking technique by Katsumata et al. [KRT24] to the FROST scheme. Notably, our design avoids the initial round of randomness sampling existing in prior schemes that employ this technique. Our design is simple and maintains the practical efficiency of FROST. Another practical advantage of ms-FROST is that it can easily be implemented in a black-box way from an existing implementation of FROST by masking the second-round messages, and in turn this only requires access to a hash function.

At the core of our work is the security analysis of ms-FROST. Along the way, we also introduce a new search problem called *weighted threshold ROS* (wtROS) problem. Most importantly, we show unconditional hardness of the problem in the ROM. We believe that our non-trivial application of the one-time masking technique could inspire further research on adaptively secure threshold signatures with improved round complexity.

Finally, to justify our use of the algebraic group model, we show an impossibility result: We rule out any algebraic black-box security reduction [BFL20, BL22] in the ROM from AOMDL to

[7] We only focus on schemes with optimal corruption threshold $t-1 < n$, which is also known as *full adaptive security*.
[8] The work by Chen [Che25b] presents a two-round scheme with full adaptive security from AOMDL and ROM. But it requires parties to hold a global session counter [NRS21].

Scheme	Rounds	Assumption	AGM	Stateful	Erasures
ZeroS [Mak22]	$1+2$	DLOG	No	No	Yes
Sparkle [CKM23]	$1+2$	AOMDL, P	Yes	No	No
KRT [KRT24]	$2+3$	DLOG	No	No	No
Glacius [BDLR25b]	$2+3$	DDH	No	No	No
Gargos [BDLR25a]	$1+2$	DDH	No	No	No
Chen [Che25b]*	$1+1$	AOMDL	No	Yes	No
Chen [Che25b]*	$2+1$	AOMDL	No	No	No
FROST [CKK+25]	$1+1$	AOMDL, LDVR	Yes	No	No
GLRS [GCRS25]	$0+2$	DDH	No	No	No
ms-FROST	$1+1$	AOMDL	Yes	No	No

Table 1. Comparison of threshold Schnorr signatures with full adaptive security $t < n$. We count the rounds as offline and online rounds. * The recent work by Chen [Che25b] gives two variants of the same scheme: The three-round version is stateless, while the two-round version requires parties to hold a global session counter. For a discussion on the practical limitations of global session counters, we refer to the work [NRS21].

the adaptive TS-UF-0 security of ms-FROST. Here, black-box means that the reduction only gets black-box access to the adversary, and algebraic means that the reduction's output has to be a linear combination of the group generator, the AOMDL challenges, and the adversary's output along with a representation. We also note that all existing security reductions for threshold Schnorr signatures fall into the class of algebraic reductions.

Concurrent Work. Very recently, Gerhart et al. [GCRS25] presented a two-round threshold Schnorr signature scheme with full adaptive security. Their protocol has two message-dependent online rounds and its security relies on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption and the ROM. Their main focus is on derivation of *deterministic nonces*, similar to the Musig-DN Schnorr multi-signature scheme [NRSW20]. However, their signing protocol relies on heavy zero-knowledge proofs to prove a deterministic derivation of the nonce to the other signers, which limits the practicality of their scheme significantly. Further, their scheme requires parties to know and agree on the message and set of signers *before* the first signing round. But most importantly, their security model restricts unforgeability only to a predefined number of $d \in \mathbb{N}$ messages and allows for key refreshments after every d signed messages. And in their scheme construction, each party refreshes its key every d signing sessions.

In another concurrent work, Baecker et al. [BGC+25] also propose the same (partially non-interactive) two-round threshold Schnorr signature scheme. In addition, the authors incorporate an interactive protocol for identifiable abort into their scheme, following the techniques of Del Pino et al. [PKN+25]. We note that the initial version of their adaptive security proof contained an error. Specifically, on pages 19–20 of the initial version, the authors *incorrectly* claim that the value β is independent of the random oracle output c^*. This claim is false because β depends on the corrupted set, as well as the hash values involved in signing queries, which may be modified or chosen after the adversary learns c^*. In fact, the dependence on the corrupted set is precisely what motivates the introduction of the new search problem, the weighted threshold ROS (wtROS) problem, which accounts for the main source of complexity in our adaptive security proof. We also mention that this issue has been corrected in a later version of their paper.

1.2 Related Work

We discuss related work with an emphasis on adaptively secure threshold signatures and threshold Schnorr signatures.

Threshold Schnorr Signatures. Initial works around the 2000's on threshold Schnorr signatures [CGJ+99, GJKR07, AF04, SS01] primarily focused on robustness, where each signing session produces a valid signature even in the presence of disruptive signers. To achieve this property, each signing session involves a distributed key generation (DKG) protocol, which requires a broadcast channel and incurs high round and communication costs. Crucially, all these constructions require a corruption threshold of $t < n/2$. While the constructions in [CGJ+99, GJKR07] achieve adaptive security, they rely heavily on secure erasures. Notably, the construction by Abe and Fehr [AF04] achieves adaptive security without relying on secure erasures, but still requires a broadcast channel and has corruption threshold $t < n/2$.

In recent years, the interest in more efficient threshold Schnorr signatures has been revived, mainly due to their applications to blockchain systems. Starting with the work of Komlo and Goldberg [KG20], which introduced FROST, there has been a large body of work on threshold Schnorr signatures with few rounds [BCK+22, CGRS23, Lin24, Mak22, CKM23, KRT24, BDLR25b, BDLR25a, CKK+25, Che25b, GCRS25]. Notably, the more recent constructions in [Mak22, CKM23, KRT24, BDLR25b, BDLR25a, CKK+25, Che25b, GCRS25] achieve adaptive security (and this with full corruption threshold $t < n$). For a detailed comparison of these schemes and ours, we refer the reader to Table 1. Another line of recent works have focused on achieving robustness in asynchronous networks [RRJ+22, GS24, BHK+24, BLSW24], where [GS24, BHK+24, BLSW24] have corruption threshold $t < n/3$ and run an asynchronous DKG protocol in each signing session. The construction in [BLSW24] achieves adaptive security, but relies on secure erasures and has corruption threshold $t < n/3$.

Adaptively Secure Threshold Signatures. We now discuss adaptively secure threshold signatures more broadly. The first adaptively secure threshold signatures were independently introduced in 1999 by Canetti et al. [CGJ+99] and Frankel et al. [FMY99] using the *single-inconsistent player* (SIP) technique combined with secure erasures. Subsequently, Jarecki and Lysyanskaya [JL00] refined the SIP technique to eliminate the need for secure erasures, and similar ideas were applied in [LP01, AF04] to build adaptively secure threshold signatures without relying on erasures. Notably, none of these constructions rely on pairings and the construction by Abe and Fehr [AF04] yields a threshold Schnorr signature.

In the pairing setting, Wang et al. [WQL09] later proposed a non-interactive, adaptively secure threshold Waters signature using ideas from Abe and Fehr [AF04]. Following that, Libert et al. [LJY14] presented another non-interactive, adaptively secure threshold signature, which generates BLS-like signatures. Recently, Bacho and Loss [BL22] proved adaptive security for Boldyreva's threshold BLS signature [Bol03]. More recently, Das and Ren [DR24] presented an adaptively secure threshold BLS signature from standard assumptions. Other more recent works have focused on the pairing-free setting. Specifically, the works [BLT+24, BW24, Che25a, Che25b] construct adaptively secure threshold signatures from standard assumptions.

2 Technical Overview

Short Recap on FROST [KG20]. Let $(\mathbb{G}, p, g)$ be a cyclic group description, where $\mathbb{G}$ is a cyclic group of prime order p and $g \in \mathbb{G}$ is a generator. Further, let H_1 and H_2 be two hash functions

(modeled as random oracles in the security proof). In FROST, each party $i \in [n]$ has a secret signing key $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and a public verification key $\mathsf{pk}_i := g^{x_i} \in \mathbb{G}$, where $\{x_i\}_{i\in[n]}$ is a (t, n)-Shamir secret sharing of a secret key x. Further, the public key of the system is $\mathsf{pk} := g^x$. We explain how a signing session in FROST works. Let $SS \subseteq [n]$ be a set of t signers that want to compute a signature on a message μ. In the first message-independent signing round, each signer $i \in SS$ samples two uniformly random secret nonces $s_i, r_i \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_p$ and then send the public nonces $(R_i, S_i) := (g^{r_i}, g^{s_i})$ to the other signers in SS. Upon receiving the public nonces from other signers $\{(R_j, S_j)\}_{j\in[SS]}$, each signer i computes its signature share $z_i := c \cdot L_i^{SS} x_i + (r_i + bs_i)$, where $b := \mathrm{H}_1(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, SS, \{(R_j, S_j)\}_{j\in[SS]})$, $c := \mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, R)$ with $R = \prod_{j\in SS}(R_j S_j^b)$, and L_i^{SS} is the i-th Lagrange coefficient for set SS. Finally, the signature shares $\{z_i\}_{i\in SS}$ are aggregated as $z := \sum_{i\in SS} z_i$, yielding the signature $\sigma := (R, z)$. Verification of a signature $\sigma = (R, z)$ with respect to public key pk and message μ is done as in the Schnorr signature scheme. The verifier first computes $c = \mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, R)$ and then checks if the equation $g^z = R \cdot \mathsf{pk}^c$ holds.

The LDVR Attack on FROST. Recent works [CKK+25, CS25] demonstrated an adaptive attack on a large class of threshold Schnorr signature schemes including FROST, assuming a problem called Low-Dimensional Vector Representation (LDVR) is efficiently solvable. Let x be the Schnorr secret key and $X = g^x$ be the Schnorr public key. The attack applies to all schemes that: 1) use Shamir's secret shares $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ of x as the secret key shares, and 2) have $X_1 = g^{x_1}, \ldots, X_n = g^{x_n}$ public among the signers. To share x using Shamir's secret sharing, the key generation samples a degree-$(t-1)$ polynomial with coefficients $a_0 = x$ and $a_1 \ldots, a_{t-1}$ being uniformly random. Then each secret key share x_i is set as $\prod_{j=0}^{t-1} a_j i^j$.

From the $g^{x_1}, \ldots, g^{x_n}$, the attacker can compute $g^{a_1}, \ldots, g^{a_{t-1}}$. It also knows g^{a_0} as it is just the main public key. To forge a Schnorr signature (R, z) on message μ, the attacker generates the nonce R as $\prod_{i=0}^{t-1}(g^{a_i})^{\beta_i}$ for some $(\beta_0, \ldots, \beta_{t-1})$ of its choice. Then it computes $c \leftarrow \mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, R)$. What remains is to compute z, the discrete logarithm of $RX^c = (g^{a_0})^{\beta_0+c} \prod_{i=1}^{t-1}(g^{a_i})^{\beta_i}$, i.e., the value $a_0(\beta_0 + c) + \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} a_i\beta_i$.

Recall that by corrupting signer i, the attacker can obtain $x_i = \prod_{j=0}^{t-1} a_j i^j$. If the attacker can find a $(t-1)$-sized subset CS of $[n]$ such that vectors $\{(1, i, i^2, \ldots, i^{t-1})\}_{i\in\mathsf{CS}}$ span $(\beta_0 + c, \beta_1, \ldots, \beta_{t-1})$, then it can corrupt all users in CS and compute s as a linear combination of $\{x_i\}_{i\in\mathsf{CS}}$. When $\binom{n}{t-1}$ is large, such a CS is likely to exist. The LDVR problem is to find out such a CS. If LDVR is easy, then the attacker is efficient. As a result, the adaptive security of FROST necessarily requires the hardness of LDVR, which seems an additional assumption independent of AOMDL.

2.1 Masked FROST

Resist The LDVR Attack with Masking. The LDVR attack relies on the fact that $g^{x_1}, \ldots, g^{x_n}$ are public, so that the attacker can generate R from them. Thus, one way to resist the LDVR attack is to hide $g^{x_1}, \ldots, g^{x_n}$. Modifying the key generation, however, is not sufficient, since the signature shares may also leak $g^{x_1}, \ldots, g^{x_n}$. In particular, in FROST, each signer i outputs a signature share (R_i, S_i, z_i) that satisfies $g^{z_i} = R_i S_i^b (g^{x_i})^{cL_i^{SS}}$, where R_i, S_i are random nonces, b and c are public hash values, and L_i^{SS} is the Lagrange coefficient. The signature share fully reveals g^{x_i}. Hence, it is also necessary to modify the signing protocol.

The one-time masking technique by Katsumata et al. [KRT24] satisfies our purpose, with minimum change to the signing protocol. The idea is to let the signers mask their signature shares with one-time shares of zero. When we combine the signature shares, the masks will cancel out, and we

correctly obtain a signature under the main public key. On the other hand, there is no other way to gain information from signature shares except combining t shares from a common signing session to cancel the masks. The only information that the attacker can get is signatures under the main public key, and $g^{x_1}, \ldots, g^{x_n}$ are perfectly hidden.

Katsumata et al. gave a clever method to generate the one-time masks. Let each pair of signers i and j share symmetric keys $\mathsf{seed}_{i,j}$ and $\mathsf{seed}_{j,i}$. When a signer set SS jointly signs, each signer i generates its mask as

$$\mathsf{mask}_i = \sum_{j \in SS} (\mathrm{H}_m(\mathsf{seed}_{i,j}, \mathsf{cn}) - \mathrm{H}_m(\mathsf{seed}_{j,i}, \mathsf{cn})),$$

where cn is some common (one-time) nonce agreed among SS. It is straightforward to verify that $\sum_{i \in SS} \mathsf{mask}_i = 0$.

Three-Round Masked FROST in [Che25b]. The idea of masking is somewhat generic. In fact, Chen has applied the technique to FROST [Che25b] and achieved full adaptive security solely in the ROM (*without* the AGM). However, the resultant scheme is *three-round*. To understand why masking introduces an additional round, let us go into more detail on how to mask FROST, in particular, which component of the signature share should be masked and what is used as cn to generate the masks.

In FROST, the signer outputs R_i and S_i in the first round and z_i in the second round. Recall that R_i and S_i are just random nonces independent of g^{x_i}. The signature share in FROST leaks g^{x_i} only from the relation $g^{z_i} = R_i S_i^b (g^{x_i})^{cL_i}$. Intuitively, it should be sufficient to only mask z_i. To generate the masks, the signers can let cn be their (common) view in the signing session.

However, it turns out that only masking z_i is not sufficient for proving full adaptive security solely in the ROM, and R_i and S_i also need to be masked [Che25b]. (In fact, we will show an impossibility result for that, on which we elaborate soon in Section 2.2.) This is where the extra round comes from. In a two-round scheme, there is no common nonce cn in the first round for the signers to generate masks for R_i, S_i! Therefore, we need to add one more round at the beginning of the signing protocol for the signers to jointly sample cn.[9]

Our Partially Non-Interactive Two-Round Scheme. In this work, we show that masking z_i is indeed sufficient for full adaptive security in the ROM *and AGM*! Our scheme is the two-round solution above, where z_i is masked while R_i and S_i are output in the clear (without being masked). However, this efficient solution introduces a new class of adaptive adversarial behavior that does not occur in any prior scheme or the static model. We capture this class of behaviors by a new search problem we call *weighted threshold ROS* (wtROS).

We start by a simple (not effective) attack. Suppose that the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ has observed two signing sessions among signer sets SS_1, SS_2 of size t, respectively. In the first round, it observed the individual nonces $R_{i,1}$, $S_{i,1}$ for $i \in SS_1$ and $R_{i,2}$, $S_{i,2}$ for $i \in SS_2$ from the two sessions, respectively. In the second round, it observed the masked individual signatures. They only provide useful information when aggregated into z_1, z_2, which are the discrete logarithms of

$$\prod_{i \in SS_1} (R_{i,1} S_{i,1}^{b_1}) X^{c_1}, \quad \prod_{i \in SS_2} (R_{i,2} S_{i,2}^{b_2}) X^{c_2},$$

respectively, for the corresponding hash values b_1, c_1, b_2, c_2.

[9] Alternatively, keep the scheme two-round while require the parties to hold a global session counter.

Let $T_{1,1}, \ldots, T_{1,l_1}$ be l_1 disjoint subsets of SS_1 and $\gamma_{1,1}, \ldots, \gamma_{1,l_1} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ be distinct integers. Similarly, let $T_{2,1}, \ldots, T_{2,l_2}$ be disjoint subsets of SS_2 and $\gamma_{2,1}, \ldots, \gamma_{2,l_2}$ be distinct integers. $\mathcal{A}$ computes a forged nonce

$$R^* = \prod_{j\in[l_1]} \prod_{i\in T_{1,j}} (R_{i,1} S_{i,1}^{b_1})^{\gamma_{1,j}} \cdot \prod_{j\in[l_2]} \prod_{i\in T_{2,j}} (R_{i,2} S_{i,2}^{b_2})^{\gamma_{2,j}}.$$

For convenience, define $T_{1,0} = SS_1 \backslash (\cup_{j\in[l_1]} T_{1,j})$, $T_{2,0} = SS_2 \backslash (\cup_{j\in[l_2]} T_{2,j})$, and $\gamma_{1,0} = \gamma_{2,0} = 0$. Then $T_{1,0}, \ldots, T_{1,l_1}$ and $T_{2,0}, \ldots, T_{2,l_2}$ partition SS_1 and SS_2, respectively, and the above equation can be reformed as

$$R^* = \prod_{j=0}^{l_1} \prod_{i\in T_{1,j}} (R_{i,1} S_{i,1}^{b_1})^{\gamma_{1,j}} \cdot \prod_{j=0}^{l_2} \prod_{i\in T_{2,j}} (R_{i,2} S_{i,2}^{b_2})^{\gamma_{2,j}}.$$

$\mathcal{A}$ computes $c^* = \mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu^*, R^*)$ for an arbitrary message μ^*. To complete the forged signature, it remains to compute z^* as the discrete logarithm of $R^* X^{c^*}$. $\mathcal{A}$ takes advantage from choosing a set CS of signers to corrupt according to c^*. Clearly, this would not work in the static model. Such an attack also does not exist for Chen's three-round masked FROST, where the individual nonces are not output in clear.

$\mathcal{A}$ chooses a corrupted set CS such that there exists T_{1,j_1} and T_{2,j_2} satisfying $SS_1 \backslash T_{1,j_1} \subseteq \mathsf{CS}$ and $SS_2 \backslash T_{2,j_2} \subseteq \mathsf{CS}$. Namely, within SS_1 and SS_2, only T_{1,j_1} and T_{2,j_2}, respectively, contain uncorrupted signers. It receives the discrete logarithms of $R_{1,i}$, $S_{1,i}$ for every $i \in SS_1 \cap \mathsf{CS}$ and $R_{2,i}$, $S_{2,i}$ for every $i \in SS_2 \cap \mathsf{CS}$. To compute z^*, what remains is to find the discrete logarithm $\hat{z}^*$ of

$$\prod_{i\in SS_1\backslash \mathsf{CS}} (R_{i,1} S_{i,1}^{b_1})^{\gamma_{1,j_1}} \cdot \prod_{i\in SS_2\backslash \mathsf{CS}} (R_{i,2} S_{i,2}^{b_2})^{\gamma_{2,j_2}} \cdot X^{c^*}.$$

Also, from z_1 and z_2, $\mathcal{A}$ can compute the discrete logarithms $\hat{z}_1$, $\hat{z}_2$ of

$$\prod_{i\in SS_1\backslash \mathsf{CS}} (R_{i,1} S_{i,1}^{b_1}) X^{c_1}, \qquad \prod_{i\in SS_2\backslash \mathsf{CS}} (R_{i,2} S_{i,2}^{b_2}) X^{c_2},$$

respectively. If $c^* = \gamma_{1,j_1} c_1 + \gamma_{2,j_2} c_2$, then $\mathcal{A}$ can compute $\hat{z}^*$ as $\gamma_{1,j_1} \hat{z}_1 + \gamma_{2,j_2} \hat{z}_2$. By carefully choosing CS, $\mathcal{A}$ can select γ_{1,j_1} and γ_{2,j_2} from $l_1 + 1$ and $l_2 + 1$ candidate values, respectively, trying to hit the given c^* by $\gamma_{1,j_1} c_1 + \gamma_{2,j_2} c_2$. To capture such a class of adversarial behavior, our wtROS problem is to hit a challenge c^* by a weighted sum of c_1, c_2, $\ldots$, c_{q}, where $\mathcal{A}$ selects the weights from a set of candidate values by choosing CS.

The success probability of the simple attack is proportional to the number of "good" values of c^* that satisfy $c^* = \gamma_{1,j_1} c_1 + \gamma_{2,j_2} c_2$ for some j_1, j_2. An obvious upper bound is $(l_1 + 1)(l_2 + 1) \leqslant t^2$. However, our wtROS problem considers the general case, where $\mathcal{A}$ can observe many signing sessions. This obvious bound would be unsatisfactory as it grows exponentially with the number of sessions. Instead, we prove a much tighter bound. Returning to the simple attack, intuitively, the source of hardness is that $\mathcal{A}$ cannot choose j_1 and j_2 independently. Clearly, j_1 and j_2 are somewhat correlated if SS_1 and SS_2 overlap. Even if they are disjoint, j_1 and j_2 are still correlated due to the limited number of corruptions. For example, $\mathcal{A}$ cannot select j_1 and j_2 such that T_{1,j_1} and T_{2,j_2} are both small, as it does not have enough corruptions to cover both $SS_1 \backslash T_{1,j_1}$ and $SS_2 \backslash T_{2,j_2}$.

2.2 Impossibility result

We complement our positive result by showing that the security of the two-round masked FROST cannot be proven under the AOMDL assumption in the ROM using any *algebraic black-box* reduction. This impossibility result holds even for the weakest security notion, adp-TS-UF-0, which only requires that an adversary cannot forge a signature on a message that was never queried to *any* honest signer.

The high-level intuition behind the barrier of doing the security reduction without the AGM can be explained as follows. First of all, for any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that breaks the security, *without rewinding*, it is hard to use it to solve the AOMDL assumption since the forgery (a Schnorr signature) output by the adversary is "zero-knowledge", i.e., the signature would not leak any information about the secret key. Then, using rewinding, the issue is that once the reduction rewinds $\mathcal{A}$, $\mathcal{A}$ can corrupt a different set of signers, and we can construct an $\mathcal{A}$ such that with high probability, the view of both executions would leak the information of the secret key. In other words, the ability to simulate both executions of $\mathcal{A}$ before and after rewinding already implies the knowledge of the secret key, which makes the extraction of the secret key via rewinding meaningless.

A TRIVIAL $\mathcal{A}$ DOES NOT WORK. To see the non-triviality of the construction of $\mathcal{A}$, we first note that the following seemingly right construction of $\mathcal{A}$ does not work. $\mathcal{A}$ starts by making a random oracle query on $\mathrm{H}_1(\mathsf{pk}, R^*, \mu^*)$, where R^* is a random group element and $\mu^* = 0$. Then, $\mathcal{A}$ samples a random corrupted set CS with size $t-1$ based on the hash value $c^* = \mathrm{H}_1(\mathsf{pk}, R^*, \mu^*)$ and corrupts all signers in CS. In particular, $\mathcal{A}$ learns the partially secret key x_i for each $i \in \mathsf{CS}$. Finally, $\mathcal{A}$ solves the discrete logarithm z^* of $R^*\mathsf{pk}^{c^*}$ by brute force and outputs the forgery $(\mu^*, (R^*, z^*))$.

Suppose the reduction rewinds $\mathcal{A}$ to the point of the random oracle query $\mathrm{H}_1(\mathsf{pk}, R^*, \mu^*)$ and sends $\mathcal{A}$ a different hash value. Then, with high probability $(1 - 1/\binom{n}{t})$, $\mathcal{A}$ corrupts a different set CS' of signers. Since both CS and CS' have size $t-1$, $|\mathsf{CS} \cup \mathsf{CS}'| \geqslant t$. Therefore, it seems that the reduction needs to output the secret key shares $\{x_i\}_{i \in \mathsf{CS} \cup \mathsf{CS}'}$, which would leak the secret key x.

However, this argument does not work since the secret key shares' obtained by $\mathcal{A}$ before $\{x_i\}_{i \in \mathsf{CS}}$ and after $\{x'_i\}_{i \in \mathsf{CS}'}$ rewinding can be inconsistent. The reduction can just output a uniformly random value in $\mathbb{Z}_p$ as the secret key share when a signer is corrupted. Using this idea, we can even reduce $\mathcal{A}$ to an adversary that breaks unforgeability of Schnorr signatures. Moreover, it shows that the key-only security of our scheme is implied by unforgeability of Schnorr signatures. Note that the above $\mathcal{A}$ is a key-only-attack adversary, i.e., $\mathcal{A}$ does not make any signing queries, and therefore, we cannot use the above $\mathcal{A}$ to show the impossibilty result.

OUR CONSTRUCTION OF $\mathcal{A}$. The lesson from the above attempt is that $\mathcal{A}$ should make some signing queries, and we construct $\mathcal{A}$ as follows.

1. $\mathcal{A}$ starts by querying a first-round message (R_i, S_i) from each signer i.
2. $\mathcal{A}$ makes a random oracle query on $\mathrm{H}_1(\mathsf{pk}, R^*, \mu^*)$, where R^* is a random group element and $\mu^* = 0$.
3. $\mathcal{A}$ samples a random corrupted set CS with size $t-1$ based on the hash value $c^* = \mathrm{H}_1(\mathsf{pk}, R^*, \mu^*)$ and corrupts all signers in CS. In particular, $\mathcal{A}$ learns the secret key share x_i and the discrete logarithm (r_i, s_i) of (R_i, S_i) to the base g for each corrupted signer $i \in \mathsf{CS}$.
4. For each honest signer i, $\mathcal{A}$ make a second-round signing query to signer i with a leader request $lr^{(i)}$, where $lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{msg} \neq \mu^*$, $lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{SS} = \mathsf{CS} \cup \{i\}$ and $lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{PP}(i) = (R_i, S_i)$. In particular, from the query, $\mathcal{A}$ learns $z_i = r_i + b_i s_i + L_{lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{SS},i} c_i x_i$, where (b_i, c_i) are the hash values computed from

$lr^{(i)}$. Also, $\mathcal{A}$ can check the correctness of z_i by checking whether

$$g^{z_i + c'_i \sum_{i \in \mathsf{CS}} L_{lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{SS},i} x_i} = g^{r_i + b'_i s_i + c'_i x} = R_i S_i^{b_i} \mathsf{pk}^{c'_i} \,. \tag{1}$$

5. Finally, $\mathcal{A}$ solves the discrete logarithm z^* of $R^* \mathsf{pk}^{c^*}$ by brute force and outputs the forgery $(\mu^*, (R^*, z^*))$.

Similarly to the above, if the reduction rewinds $\mathcal{A}$ to the point of the random oracle query, with high probability, the sets of corrupted parties CS before and CS' after rewinding are different. Since both CS and CS' have size $t-1$, there exists $j \in \mathsf{CS} \backslash \mathsf{CS}'$. Then, in step 4 of the second execution, the reduction needs to output $z'_j = r'_j + b'_j s'_j + L_{lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{SS},j} c'_j x'_j$. However, since $\mathcal{A}$ corrupts signer j during the first execution, the reduction has to output (r_j, s_j). Note that since the same (R_j, S_j) are used in both executions, we have $(r_j, s_j) = (r'_j, s'_j)$ and thus one can extract $x'_j = \frac{z'_j - r_j - b'_j s_j}{L^{lr^{(j)}.\mathsf{SS},j} c'_j}$. For each $i \in \mathsf{CS}'$, denote x'_i as the secret key share of signer i output by the reduction when signer i is corrupted during the second execution. Since $|\{j\} \cup \mathsf{CS}'| = t$, one can recover x from the secret shares $\{x'_i\}_{i \in \{j\} \cup \mathsf{CS}}$. Notably, the difference from the above case is that here all the shares used are generated in the second execution, instead of across two different executions. Concretely, by Equation (1),

$$g^{(z'_j + c'_j \sum_{i \in \mathsf{CS}} L_{lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{SS},i} x'_i - r_j - b'_j s_j)/c'_j} = (R_j S_j^{b'_j} \mathsf{pk}^{c'_j} R_j^{-1} S_j^{-b'_j})^{1/c'_j} = \mathsf{pk} \,.$$

Using this construction of $\mathcal{A}$, we show that any (algebraic) reduction $\mathcal{B}$ that uses $\mathcal{A}$ to break AOMDL must be able to break AOMDL by itself. We refer to Section 5 for the formal theorem and the proof.

3 Preliminaries

3.1 Notation

We use $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$ to denote the security parameter and assume that all algorithms get 1^κ implicitly as input. For any positive integers $a < b$, we define $[a] := \{1, \ldots, a\}$ and $[a, b] := \{a, \ldots, b\}$. For a finite set S, we use $x \leftarrow\!\!\$\, S$ to denote sampling an element uniformly at random from S and assigning its value to x. Further, $|S|$ denotes the size of S. We use standard cryptographic notions such as negligible, overwhelming, and probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT). For an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, we use $y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{O}_k}(x; r)$ to denote that $\mathcal{A}$ is run on input x and coins r with access to oracles $\mathsf{O}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{O}_k$ and assigning the output to y. If the coins r are sampled uniformly at random, then we write $y \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{O}_k}(x)$. We assume that all algorithms are randomized, unless indicated otherwise. Finally, we make use of game-based security definitions and write $\mathrm{Game}^{\mathcal{A}} = b$ to denote the event that the execution of game Game with adversary $\mathcal{A}$ results in output b.

GROUPS. We let GGen be a *group generation* algorithm that takes as input the security parameter 1^κ and outputs the tuple $(\mathbb{G}, p, g)$, where $\mathbb{G}$ is a cyclic group of prime order $p \geqslant 2^\kappa$ and $g \in \mathbb{G}$ is a generator. We write the group in multiplicative notation, and call the tuple $(\mathbb{G}, p, g)$ a *group description*.

3.2 Assumptions

For our security proof, we rely on the following assumptions.




Fig. 1. The $\text{AOMDL}_{\mathsf{GGen}}$ game with adversary $\mathcal{A}$.

IDEALIZED MODELS. We assume the *random oracle model* (ROM) [BR93], where a hash function H is treated as an idealized random function. The security of all existing schemes for Schnorr signatures relies on the random oracle model. Further, we assume the *algebraic group model* (AGM) [FKL18], where the adversary is assumed to be algebraic. An algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is algebraic (over group $\mathbb{G}$) if for all group elements $\zeta \in \mathbb{G}$ that it outputs, it also outputs a vector $\mathbf{z} = (z_1, \ldots, z_k)$ of integers such that $\zeta = \prod_{i\in[k]} g_i^{z_i}$, where $(g_1, \ldots, g_k)$ is the list of group elements it has observed so far.

HARDNESS ASSUMPTION. We assume the hardness of the algebraic one-more discrete logarithm (AOMDL) problem [NRS21]. In the respective security game, the adversary is given a group description $(\mathbb{G}, p, g)$ as input. It wins the game if it outputs the discrete logarithms $y_1, \ldots, y_\ell \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ (to base g) of ℓ challenge group elements $X_1, \ldots, X_\ell \in \mathbb{G}$ obtained from an oracle CHAL(), while making at most $\ell - 1$ queries to a discrete logarithm oracle DLOG(). Importantly, whenever the adversary queries DLOG() on some element $X \in \mathbb{G}$, it is required to do so via an algebraic representation of X with respect to the group elements it has received so far (i.e., the adversary is required to behave algebraic).

Formally, let GGen be a group generation algorithm, and let $\text{AOMDL}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\mathsf{GGen}}$ be the security game defined in Figure 1. Then, we say that the algebraic one-more discrete logarithm (AOMDL) problem is hard for GGen if for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, we have $\mathsf{Pr}[\text{AOMDL}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\mathsf{GGen}}(\kappa) = 1] \leqslant \mathsf{negl}(\kappa)$.

3.3 Threshold signatures

We define partially non-interactive threshold signatures using the formalization proposed by Bellare et al. [BCK+22], with straightforward adaption to the setting with adaptive corruptions.

SYNTAX. A partially non-interactive threshold signature schemes for n signers and threshold t is a tuple of PPT algorithms $\mathsf{TS} = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{SPP}, \mathsf{LPP}, \mathsf{LR}, \mathsf{PS}, \mathsf{Agg}, \mathsf{Vf})$ with the following specification. An execution of the scheme involves a leader and n signers. The setup algorithm $\mathsf{Setup}(1^\kappa)$ initializes the state st_i for each signer $i \in [n]$, the state st_0 for the leader, and also the public parameters *par*. (We assume that all other algorithms get *par* implicitly as input.) The key generation algorithm $\mathsf{KeyGen}()$ returns a public verification key pk, and a secret key sk_i for each signer $i \in [n]$. (In particular, we assume an ideal key generation, and as in prior works, do not model distributed key generation.)

The signing protocol consists of two rounds: In the first, message-independent offline round, any signer i can run $\mathsf{SPP}(\mathsf{st}_i)$ to generate a *pre-processing token* pp. This token pp is then sent to the leader who runs $\mathsf{LPP}(i, pp, \mathsf{st}_0)$ to update its state st_0 to incorporate the token pp. In the second, message-dependent online round, for a signer set $SS \subseteq [n]$ with size t and message $\mu \in \{0,1\}^*$, the

Game $\text{TS-COR}_{\mathsf{TS}}(\kappa, \mu, SS)$:

$par \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\kappa)$; $(\mathsf{pk}, \{\mathsf{sk}_i\}_{i\in[n]}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}()$
For $i \in [n]$ do $\mathsf{st}_i.\mathsf{sk} \leftarrow \mathsf{sk}_i$; $\mathsf{st}_i.\mathsf{pk} \leftarrow \mathsf{pk}$
For $i \in SS$ do
  $(pp_i, \mathsf{st}_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SPP}(\mathsf{st}_i)$; $\mathsf{st}_0 \leftarrow \mathsf{LPP}(i, pp_i, \mathsf{st}_0)$
$(lr, \mathsf{st}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{LR}(\mu, SS, \mathsf{st}_0)$
For $i \in SS$ do $(psig_i, \mathsf{st}_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{PS}(lr, i, \mathsf{st}_i)$
$sig \leftarrow \mathsf{Agg}(\{psig_i\}_{i\in SS})$
Return $\mathsf{Vf}(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, sig)$

Fig. 2. The correctness game TS-COR for a threshold signature scheme TS for n signers and threshold t.

Game $\text{adp-TS-UF-0}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\mathsf{TS}}(\kappa)$, $\text{adp-TS-UF-4}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\mathsf{TS}}(\kappa)$:

$par \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\kappa)$; $\mathrm{H} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathsf{TS.HF}$
$\mathsf{HS} \leftarrow [n]$; $\mathsf{CS} \leftarrow \varnothing$
$(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{sk}_n) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}()$
For $i \in [n]$ do $\mathsf{st}_i.\mathsf{sk} \leftarrow \mathsf{sk}_i$
curSS $\leftarrow ()$; curLR $\leftarrow \varnothing$; $\mathrm{S} \leftarrow \varnothing$
$(\mu, sig) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{COR,PPO,PSIGNO,RO}}(par, \mathsf{pk})$
If $\mu \in \mathrm{S}$ then return 0
If $\exists\ lr \in$ curLR : $lr.\mathsf{msg} = \mu$
  $\wedge\ lr.\mathsf{SS} \cap \mathsf{HS} \subseteq$ curSS(lr) then
  Return 0
Return $\mathsf{Vf}(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, sig)$

Oracle $\text{COR}(i)$:

Require: $i \in \mathsf{HS}$ and $|\mathsf{CS}| < t - 1$
$\mathsf{CS} \leftarrow \mathsf{CS}\backslash\{i\}$; $\mathsf{HS} \leftarrow [n]\backslash\mathsf{CS}$
Return st_i

Oracle $\text{RO}(x)$:

Return $\mathrm{H}(x)$

Oracle $\text{PPO}(i)$:

Require: $i \in \mathsf{HS}$
$(pp, \mathsf{st}_i) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathsf{SPP}(\mathsf{st}_i)$
$\mathrm{PP}_i \leftarrow \mathrm{PP}_i \cup \{pp\}$
Return pp

Oracle $\text{PSIGNO}(i, lr)$:

Require: $lr.\mathsf{SS} \subseteq [n]$
  $\wedge\ i \in \mathsf{HS} \cap lr.\mathsf{SS}$
  $\wedge\ |lr.\mathsf{SS}| \geqslant t$
$(psig, \mathsf{st}'_i) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathsf{PS}(lr, i, \mathsf{st}_i)$
If $psig = \perp$ then return $\perp$
$\mathrm{S} \leftarrow \mathrm{S} \cup \{lr.\mathsf{msg}\}$
If $lr \notin$ curLR then
  curLR $\leftarrow$ curLR $\cup \{lr\}$
  curSS$(lr) \leftarrow \varnothing$
curSS$(lr) \leftarrow$ curSS$(lr) \cup \{i\}$
Return $psig$

Fig. 3. The games adp-TS-UF-0 and adp-TS-UF-4 for a threshold signature scheme TS for n signers and threshold t, where adp-TS-UF-0 contains all but the solid box and adp-TS-UF-4 contains all but the dashed box. Here $\mathsf{TS.HF}$ denotes the family of the hash functions from which the random oracle is sampled.

leader first runs $\mathsf{LR}(\mu, SS, \mathsf{st}_0)$ to generate a leader request lr with $lr.\mathsf{msg} = \mu$ and $lr.\mathsf{SS} = SS$, and then sends lr to each signer $i \in SS$. Next, each signer i runs $\mathsf{PS}(lr, i, \mathsf{st}_i)$ to generate its partial signature $psig_i$. Finally, the leader computes a signature sig for message μ by running $\mathsf{Agg}(\{psig_i\}_{i\in SS})$. The deterministic verification algorithm $\mathsf{Vf}(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, sig)$ returns a bit that indicates whether the signature sig is valid for the public key and message pair (pk, μ).

We model an honest execution of the signing protocol using the correctness game TS-COR defined in Figure 2. We say that TS is *perfectly correct* if for any message $\mu \in \{0,1\}^*$ and any signer set $SS \subseteq [n]$ with $|SS| \geqslant t$, we have $\mathsf{Pr}[\text{TS-COR}_{\mathsf{TS}}(\kappa, \mu, SS) = 1] = 1$.

SECURITY. For security, we require unforgeability of signatures. Informally, this guarantees that an adversary cannot forge a signature on any message that has not already been signed. Regarding

the conditions under which a message is considered as signed, Bellare et al. [BCK+22] proposed a hierarchy of unforgeability notions TS-UF-i for $i \in [0,4]$. In this work, we consider the weakest and the strongest notion, TS-UF-0 and TS-UF-4, respectively. Concretely, TS-UF-0 considers a message μ as signed only if the adversary obtained a partial signature on μ from at least *one honest signer*. On the other hand, TS-UF-4 considers a message μ as signed only if there exists a leader request lr on μ for which the adversary obtained the partial signatures from *all honest signers* (in the respective signer set $lr.\mathsf{SS}$ for that leader request lr). Finally, to account for adaptive corruptions, we simply add a corruption oracle that can be queried at most $t-1$ by the adversary. Further, we also add a random oracle to the security games to account for hash functions used in the threshold signature scheme.

Formally, we define the games adp-TS-UF-0 and adp-TS-UF-4 for a threshold signature scheme TS in Figure 3. In both games, $\mathsf{TS.HF}$ denotes the space of the hash functions used in TS from which the random oracle is drawn. For $\mathsf{X} \in \{0,4\}$, we define the advantage of an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in the adp-TS-UF-X game as $\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{adp-ts-uf-X}}_{\mathsf{TS}}(\mathcal{A},\kappa) := \mathsf{Pr}\left[\text{adp-TS-UF-X}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\mathsf{TS}}(\kappa)=1\right]$

4 Our Construction

We present our scheme ms-FROST[GGen] in Figure 4, where GGen is a group generation algorithm. The public parameters are $(\mathbb{G},p,g) \leftarrow \mathsf{GGen}(1^\kappa)$, where $\mathbb{G}$ is a cyclic group of prime order p and $g \in \mathbb{G}$ is a generator. Further, we use three hash functions $\mathrm{H}_1, \mathrm{H}_2, \mathrm{H}_m$. Each party $i \in [n]$ has a secret signing key $\mathsf{sk}_i \leftarrow (\mathsf{ss}_i, (\mathsf{seed}_{i,j}, \mathsf{seed}_{j,i})_{j\in[n]})$, where $\{\mathsf{ss}_i\}_{i\in[n]}$ are (t,n)-Shamir secret shares of a main secret key $\widehat{\mathsf{sk}} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and the $\mathsf{seed}_{i,j} \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$ are uniformly random values (without correlation). Note that parties do not have verification keys. Further, the public key of the system is $\mathsf{pk} \leftarrow g^{\widehat{\mathsf{sk}}}$.

A signing session works as follows. In the first message-independent signing round, each signer i samples two uniformly random secret nonces $s_i, r_i \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_p$ and then send the nonce pair $(R_i,S_i) \leftarrow (g^{r_i}, g^{s_i})$ to the leader. To sign a message μ with the set of signers SS, the leader creates a leader request lr, which contains a map PP that maps each $i \in SS$ to its first-round nonce pair (R_i,S_i), and sends it to each signer in SS. Upon receiving the leader request lr, each signer i computes a mask mask_i from the hash function H_m based on the context (pk, lr) and returns a masked signature share $z_i \leftarrow r_i + bs_i + c \cdot L_i^{SS}\mathsf{ss}_i + \mathsf{mask}_i$. Finally, the signature shares $\{z_i\}_{i\in SS}$ are aggregated as $z \leftarrow \sum_{i\in SS} z_i$, yielding the signature $\sigma \leftarrow (R,z)$. Verification is done as in the regular Schnorr signature scheme. It is easy to verify that the scheme is perfectly correct.

Remark 1. Our scheme, like other masking-based threshold signatures [DKM+24, EKT24, Che25b], does not naturally support identifiable abort (IA). However, del Pino et al. [PKN+25] recently proposed an efficient transformation of threshold Raccoon [DKM+24], a lattice-based masking scheme, to achieve IA. One interesting future work is to investigate whether a similar approach can be applied to our scheme, while preserving adaptive security.

Security. We show adp-TS-UF-4 (cf. Figure 3) of ms-FROST in the AGM and ROM, assuming hardness of the AOMDL problem (cf. Figure 1). We emphasize that adp-TS-UF-4 is the adaptive version of the strongest security (TS-UF-4) in the security hierarchy defined by Bellare et al. [BTZ22] for partially non-interactive threshold signature. Formally, we show the following main theorem.

$\underline{\mathsf{Setup}(1^\kappa):}$
$(\mathbb{G}, p, g) \leftarrow \mathsf{GGen}(1^\kappa)$
For $i \in [1..n]$ do
  $\mathsf{st}_0.\mathrm{curPP}_i \leftarrow \varnothing$
  $\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP} \leftarrow ()$
  $\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{validPP} \leftarrow ()$
$par \leftarrow (\mathbb{G}, p, g)$
Return par

$\underline{\mathsf{KeyGen}():}$
$\widehat{\mathsf{sk}} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_p$; $\mathsf{pk} \leftarrow g^{\widehat{\mathsf{sk}}}$
For $(i,j) \in [n] \times [n]$ do
  $\mathsf{seed}_{i,j} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \{0,1\}^\kappa$
$\boldsymbol{a}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{a}_{t-1} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_p$
For $i \in [n]$ do
  $\mathsf{ss}_i \leftarrow \widehat{\mathsf{sk}} + \sum_{j=1}^{t-1} \boldsymbol{a}_j i^j$
  $\mathsf{sk}_i \leftarrow (\mathsf{ss}_i, (\mathsf{seed}_{i,j}, \mathsf{seed}_{j,i})_{j\in[n]})$
Return $(\mathsf{pk}, (\mathsf{sk}_i)_{i\in[n]})$

$\underline{\mathsf{SPP}(\mathsf{st}_i):}$
$r, s \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_p$; $R \leftarrow g^r$; $S \leftarrow g^s$
$pp \leftarrow (R, S)$
$\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(pp) \leftarrow (r, s)$
$\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{validPP}(pp) \leftarrow 1$
Return (pp, st_i)

$\underline{\mathsf{LPP}(i, pp, \mathsf{st}_0):}$
$\mathsf{st}_0.\mathrm{curPP}_i \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_0.\mathrm{curPP}_i \cup \{pp\}$
Return st_0

$\underline{\mathsf{LR}(\mu, SS, \mathsf{st}_0):}$
If $\exists\, i \in SS : \mathsf{st}_0.\mathrm{curPP}_i = \varnothing$ then
  Return $\perp$
$lr.\mathsf{msg} \leftarrow \mu$; $lr.\mathsf{SS} \leftarrow SS$
For $i \in SS$ do
  Pick pp_i from $\mathsf{st}_0.\mathrm{curPP}_i$
  $lr.\mathsf{PP}(i) \leftarrow pp_i$
  $\mathsf{st}_0.\mathrm{curPP}_i \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_0.\mathrm{curPP}_i \backslash \{pp_i\}$
Return (lr, st_0)

$\underline{\mathsf{CompPar}(\mathsf{pk}, lr):}$
$\mu \leftarrow lr.\mathsf{msg}$
For $i \in lr.\mathsf{SS}$ do
  $(R_i, S_i) \leftarrow lr.\mathsf{PP}(i)$
$b \leftarrow \mathrm{H}_1(\mathsf{pk}, lr)$
$R \leftarrow \prod_{i\in lr.\mathsf{SS}} (R_i S_i^b)$
$c \leftarrow \mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, R)$
Return (R, c, b)

$\underline{\mathsf{PS}(lr, i, \mathsf{st}_i):}$
$pp_i \leftarrow lr.\mathsf{PP}(i)$
If $\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{validPP}(pp_i) \neq 1$ then
  Return $(\perp, \mathsf{st}_i)$
$(r, s) \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(pp_i)$
$\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{validPP}(pp_i) \leftarrow 0$
$(R, c, b) \leftarrow \mathsf{CompPar}(\mathsf{st}_i.\mathsf{pk}, lr)$
$(\mathsf{ss}_i, (\mathsf{seed}_{i,j}, \mathsf{seed}_{j,i})_{j\in[n]}) \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_i.\mathsf{sk}$
$\mathsf{mask} \leftarrow \sum_{j\in lr.SS} \mathrm{H}_m(\mathsf{seed}_{i,j}, (\mathsf{pk}, lr))$
$\mathsf{mask}' \leftarrow \sum_{j\in lr.SS} \mathrm{H}_m(\mathsf{seed}_{j,i}, (\mathsf{pk}, lr))$
$z \leftarrow r + bs + cL_i^{lr.\mathsf{SS}}\mathsf{ss}_i + \mathsf{mask} - \mathsf{mask}'$
Return $((R, z), \mathsf{st}_i)$

$\underline{\mathsf{Agg}(\mathrm{PS}, \mathsf{st}_0):}$
$R \leftarrow \perp$; $z \leftarrow 0$
For $(R', z') \in \mathrm{PS}$ do
  If $R = \perp$ then $R \leftarrow R'$
  If $R \neq R'$ then return $(\perp, \mathsf{st}_0)$
  $z \leftarrow z + z'$
Return $((R, z), \mathsf{st}_0)$

$\underline{\mathsf{Vf}(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, sig):}$
$(R, z) \leftarrow sig$
$c \leftarrow \mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, R)$
Return $(g^z = R\mathsf{pk}^c)$

Fig. 4. The protocol ms-FROST[GGen], where GGen is a group generation algorithm. In particular, t denotes the threshold, n denotes the number of signers, and $L_i^{lr.\mathsf{SS}} := \prod_{j\in lr.\mathsf{SS}\backslash\{i\}} -j/(i-j)$ denotes the Lagrange coefficient for the set $lr.\mathsf{SS}$. We remark that, as stated earlier, the public parameter par is implicitly given to all algorithms except Setup. We use $\mathrm{H}_1(\cdot), \mathrm{H}_2(\cdot), \mathrm{H}_m(\cdot)$ to denote functions $\mathrm{H}(\texttt{'1'}, \cdot)$, $\mathrm{H}(\texttt{'2'}, \cdot)$, $\mathrm{H}(\texttt{'m'}, \cdot)$ respectively.

Theorem 1. *For any* GGen *and any algebraic* adp-TS-UF-4 *adversary* $\mathcal{A}$ *making at most* $\mathsf{q}_s = \mathsf{q}_s(\kappa)$ *queries to* PPO *and* $\mathsf{q}_h = \mathsf{q}_h(\kappa)$ *queries to* RO*, there exists an* AOMDL *adversary* $\mathcal{B}$ *running in time roughly the same as* $\mathcal{A}$ *such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{adp-ts-uf-4}}_{\text{ms-FROST[GGen]}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa) \leqslant \mathsf{Adv}^{\text{aomdl}}_{\mathsf{GGen}}(\mathcal{B}, \kappa) + \frac{\mathsf{q}_h(2n^2 + t + \mathsf{q}_h)}{2^\kappa} .$$

where n denotes the number of signers.




Fig. 5. The Ideal-adp-UF game, where the algorithms CompPar and Vf are defined in Figure 4.

We show the theorem in two steps. First, we reduce the adp-TS-UF-4 of ms-FROST to an intermediate game Ideal-adp-UF, which is defined in Figure 5. Then, we reduce the intermediate game to the hardness of AOMDL in the AGM and ROM. Notably, our reduction in the first step does not rely on the AGM. Intuitively, the game Ideal-adp-UF can be viewed as an ideal variant of the adaptive threshold signing game, where instead of a partial signing oracle PSignO which returns a partial signature, the game only provides an oracle SignO that takes any leader request lr as input and directly returns the aggregated signature, given that lr is a valid request.

Lemma 1. *For any* GGen *and any* adp-TS-UF-4 *adversary* $\mathcal{A}$ *making at most* $\mathsf{q}_s = \mathsf{q}_s(\kappa)$ *queries to* PPO *and* $\mathsf{q}_h = \mathsf{q}_h(\kappa)$ *queries to* RO*, there exists an* Ideal-adp-UF *adversary* $\mathcal{B}$ *making at most* q_s *queries to* PPO *and* q_h *queries to* RO *running in time roughly the same as* $\mathcal{A}$ *such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{adp-ts-uf-4}}_{\mathsf{ms\text{-}FROST[GGen]}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa) \leqslant \mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ideal-adp-uf}}(\mathcal{B}, \kappa) + \frac{2\mathsf{q}_h n^2}{2^\kappa} .$$

where n *denotes the number of signers. Also, if* $\mathcal{A}$ *is algebraic, then* $\mathcal{B}$ *is also algebraic.*

Lemma 2. *For any* GGen *and any algebraic adversary* $\mathcal{A}$ *playing the* Ideal-adp-UF *game making at most* $\mathsf{q}_s = \mathsf{q}_s(\kappa)$ *queries to* PPO *and* $\mathsf{q}_h = \mathsf{q}_h(\kappa)$ *queries to* RO*, there exists an* AOMDL *adversary* $\mathcal{B}$ *running in time roughly the same as* $\mathcal{A}$ *such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ideal-adp-uf}}_{\mathsf{GGen}}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa) \leqslant \mathsf{Adv}^{\text{aomdl}}_{\mathsf{GGen}}(\mathcal{B}, \kappa) + \frac{\mathsf{q}_h(t + \mathsf{q}_h)}{2^\kappa} .$$

where n *denotes the number of signers.*

4.1 Proof of Lemma 1

Proof. We prove the lemma via the following series of games.

$\mathbf{G}_0$: This is the same as adp-TS-UF-4. The game is formally defined in Figure 7.

$\mathbf{G}_1$: The same as $\mathbf{G}_0$ except that the order of computing masks is changed. More precisely, the masks $\{\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}\}_{i\in[n]}$ are computed all at once when the adversary made a PSIGNO query on lr for the first time, where $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ denotes the correct mask computed by signer i. Since the game only differs from $\mathbf{G}_0$ in the oracle PSIGNO, we only show the new PSIGNO oracle in Figure 8. The way $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ is computed is the same as before except for one index $\hat{j}$, where $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,\hat{j}} \leftarrow -\sum_{j\in lr.\mathsf{SS}\setminus\{\hat{j}\}} \mathsf{mask}_{lr,j}$, but the value of $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,\hat{j}}$ remains the same as $\mathbf{G}_0$ since

$$\begin{aligned}\mathsf{mask}_{lr,\hat{j}} &= -\sum_{j\in lr.\mathsf{SS}\setminus\{\hat{j}\}} \mathsf{mask}_{lr,j}\\ &= -\sum_{j\in lr.\mathsf{SS}\setminus\{\hat{j}\}}\sum_{j'\in lr.\mathsf{SS}} (\mathrm{H}_m(\mathsf{seed}_{j,j'},\mathsf{pk},lr) - \mathrm{H}_m(\mathsf{seed}_{j',j},\mathsf{pk},lr))\\ &= \sum_{j\in lr.\mathsf{SS}\setminus\{\hat{j}\}} (\mathrm{H}_m(\mathsf{seed}_{\hat{j},j},\mathsf{pk},lr) - \mathrm{H}_m(\mathsf{seed}_{j,\hat{j}},\mathsf{pk},lr))\ .\end{aligned}$$

The view of $\mathcal{A}$ in $\mathbf{G}_1$ is identical to $\mathbf{G}_0$, and thus $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_0}(\mathcal{A},\kappa) = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_1}(\mathcal{A},\kappa)$.

$\mathbf{G}_2$: The same as $\mathbf{G}_1$ except that we change the order of computing masks and the hash functions. In particular, for a mask $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,j}$ from an honest signer j, we first sample mask_{lr} uniformly from $\mathbb{Z}_p$ and then program the random oracle to make it consistent with the mask by setting $\mathrm{H}_m(\mathsf{seed}_{j,\hat{j}}\mathsf{pk}, lr) \leftarrow \mathsf{mask}_{lr,j} - \sum_{j'\in lr.SS\setminus\{\hat{j}\}} \mathrm{RO}(\texttt{'m'}, \mathsf{seed}_{j,j'}, \mathsf{pk}, lr) + \sum_{j'\in lr.SS} \mathrm{RO}(\texttt{'m'}, \mathsf{seed}_{j',j}, \mathsf{pk}, lr)$, where $\hat{j}$ is another honest party in $lr.\mathsf{SS}$. The difference between the games is shown in Figure 8. The view of $\mathcal{A}$ in $\mathbf{G}_2$ is identical to that of $\mathbf{G}_1$ if the adversary does not make a random oracle on $\mathsf{seed}_{j,\hat{j}}$ before the value $\mathrm{H}_m(\mathsf{seed}_{j,\hat{j}}\mathsf{pk}, lr)$ is programmed. Denote $\mathsf{BadSeed}$ as the event that the adversary makes a random oracle query on $\mathsf{seed}_{j,\hat{j}}$ for some signers $j,\hat{j}$ that are not corrupted when the RO query is made. Since $\mathsf{seed}_{j,\hat{j}}$ is uniformly sampled from $\{0,1\}^\kappa$ and unknown to the adversary, we know that the probability is bounded as $\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{BadSeed}\text{ occurs in }\mathbf{G}_1] \leqslant \frac{\mathsf{q}_h n^2}{2^\kappa}$. Therefore, we get $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_1}(\mathcal{A},\kappa) \leqslant \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_2}(\mathcal{A},\kappa) + \mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{BadSeed}\text{ occurs in }\mathbf{G}_1] \leqslant \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_2}(\mathcal{A},\kappa) + \frac{\mathsf{q}_h n^2}{2^\kappa}$.

$\mathbf{G}_3$: The same as $\mathbf{G}_2$ except that we delay the sampling of each hash value $\mathrm{H}_m(\mathsf{seed}_{i,j},\mathsf{pk},lr)$ until i or j is corrupted. The difference between the games is shown in Figure 9. The view of $\mathcal{A}$ in $\mathbf{G}_3$ is identical to that of $\mathbf{G}_2$ as long as the event $\mathsf{BadSeed}$ does not occur, since if $\mathsf{BadSeed}$ does not occur, the corruption of either party i or j is the earliest point at which the adversary can learn the corresponding hash values. Therefore, we get $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_2}(\mathcal{A},\kappa) \leqslant \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_3}(\mathcal{A},\kappa) + \mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{BadSeed}\text{ occurs in }\mathbf{G}_2] \leqslant \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_3}(\mathcal{A},\kappa) + \frac{\mathsf{q}_h n^2}{2^\kappa}$.

$\mathbf{G}_4$: The same as $\mathbf{G}_3$ except that we further delay the sampling of the mask $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ until the PSIGNO query corresponding to (lr,i) is handled. The difference between the games is shown in Figure 10, and the algorithm $\mathsf{SampleMask}$ is defined in Figure 11. The view of $\mathcal{A}$ in $\mathbf{G}_4$ is identical to that in $\mathbf{G}_3$, and thus $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_4}(\mathcal{A},\kappa) = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_3}(\mathcal{A},\kappa)$.

$\mathbf{G}_5$: The same as $\mathbf{G}_4$ except that 1. the computation of z in the oracle PSIGNO is moved to the algorithm $\mathsf{SampleMask}$ and 2. the computation of $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ in $\mathsf{SampleMask}$ is changed in case $\mathsf{hon} \subseteq \mathrm{curSS}(lr)$. The difference between the games is shown in Figure 11, where $z_{lr,i}$ denotes the response for the PSIGNO query (lr,i). Note that $z_{lr,i}$ is only computed in $\mathsf{SampleMask}$ if

$\mathsf{SampleMask}$ is invoked by the PSignO, which occurs if and only if $i \in \mathsf{HS}$. Also, it is not hard to show that the value of $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ after the changes remains the same since $-\sum_{j\in lr.\mathsf{SS}\setminus\{i\}} \mathsf{mask}_{lr,j} = -\sum_{j\in\mathsf{hon}'} \mathsf{mask}_{lr,j} - \sum_{j\in\mathsf{cor}'} \mathsf{mask}_{lr,j} = -\sum_{j\in\mathsf{hon}'}(z_{lr,j} - r_{lr,j} - bs_{lr,j} - c\cdot L_j^{lr.\mathsf{SS}}\mathsf{ss}_j) - \sum_{j\in\mathsf{cor}'} \mathsf{mask}_{lr,j}$. Hence, the view of $\mathcal{A}$ in $\mathbf{G}_5$ is identical to that in $\mathbf{G}_4$, and thus $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_4}(\mathcal{A},\kappa) = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_5}(\mathcal{A},\kappa)$.

$\mathbf{G}_6$: The same as $\mathbf{G}_5$ except that we change the order of computing $z_{lr,i}$ and $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ in $\mathsf{SampleMask}$. In particular, for the case $\mathsf{hon} \notin \mathrm{curSS}(lr)$, which means that i is not the last signer in $lr.\mathsf{SS}$ with $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ not determined, we first sample $z_{lr,i}$ uniformly from $\mathbb{Z}_p$ and then compute $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ from $z_{lr,i}$. Otherwise, we know the mask $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ and thus $z_{lr,i}$ is already determined. Therefore, $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ and $z_{lr,i}$ are computed following $\mathbf{G}_5$ except that the order is changed. The difference between the games is shown in Figure 12. The view of $\mathcal{A}$ in $\mathbf{G}_6$ is identical to that in $\mathbf{G}_5$, and thus $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_5}(\mathcal{A},\kappa) = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_6}(\mathcal{A},\kappa)$.

$\mathbf{G}_7$: The same as $\mathbf{G}_6$ except that we further delay the computation of the mask $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ in $\mathsf{SampleMask}$ in case $i \in \mathsf{HS}$ until signer i is corrupted. The difference between the games is shown in Figure 12. The delay of computing $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ would not affect the view of $\mathcal{A}$ since $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ is only used when signer i is corrupted. Therefore, we get $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_6}(\mathcal{A},\kappa) = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_7}(\mathcal{A},\kappa)$.

Construction of $\mathcal{B}$. We now show how to construct an Ideal-adp-UF adversary $\mathcal{B}$ that runs $\mathcal{A}$ by simulating the game $\mathbf{G}_7$. To start with, after receiving $(\mathbb{G}, p, g, \mathsf{pk})$ from the Ideal-adp-UF game, $\mathcal{B}$ initializes st_i.mapPP for each $i \in [n]$, H, HS, CS, curSS and curLR following the game $\mathbf{G}_7$. Then, $\mathcal{B}$ samples the seeds $\mathsf{seed}_{i,j}$ for all $i, j \in [n]$ and runs $\mathcal{A}$ with input $(\mathbb{G}, p, g, \mathsf{pk})$ and access to oracles $\widetilde{\mathrm{Cor}}$, $\widetilde{\mathrm{PPO}}$, $\widetilde{\mathrm{PSignO}}$ and $\widetilde{\mathrm{RO}}$, which are simulated as follows.

$\widetilde{\mathbf{RO}}(x)$: If x can be pharsed as $(\texttt{'m'}, y)$, $\mathcal{B}$ simulates the random oracle by itself, i.e., $\mathcal{B}$ samples $\mathrm{H}_m(y) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_p$ if $\mathrm{H}_m(y) = \bot$ and returns $\mathrm{H}_m(y)$. Otherwise, $\mathcal{B}$ forwards the query directly to its own oracle RO.

$\widetilde{\mathbf{Cor}}(i)$: $\mathcal{B}$ samples $\mathsf{ss}_i \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sets $\mathsf{st}_i.\mathsf{sk} \leftarrow \mathsf{ss}_i$. Then, $\mathcal{B}$ queries $\mathrm{Cor}(i)$, and after receiving a state $\tilde{\mathsf{st}}_i$, for each (R, S) with $\tilde{\mathsf{st}}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(R, S) \neq \bot$, $\mathcal{B}$ sets $\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(R, S) \leftarrow \tilde{\mathsf{st}}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(R, S)$. Finally, $\mathcal{B}$ executes $\mathrm{Cor}(i)$ as in $\mathbf{G}_7$, except that when the RO oracle is invoked, $\mathcal{B}$ calls $\widetilde{\mathrm{RO}}$ instead, and the execution of the algorithm $\mathsf{SampleMask}$ is modified, which will be described later.

$\widetilde{\mathbf{PPO}}$: $\mathcal{B}$ forwards queries directly to its own oracle PPO. After receiving (R, S), $\mathcal{B}$ sets $\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(R, S) \leftarrow (\top, \top)$ and returns (R, S).

$\widetilde{\mathbf{PSignO}}(i, lr)$: Same as PSignO in $\mathbf{G}_7$, except that the execution of the algorithm $\mathsf{SampleMask}$ is modified, as described below.

$\mathsf{SampleMask}(lr, i)$**:** Same as in $\mathbf{G}_7$ except that $z_{lr,i}$ and $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ are computed as follows in case $\mathsf{hon} \subseteq \mathrm{curSS}(lr)$. $\mathcal{B}$ queries $\tilde{z} \leftarrow \mathrm{SignO}(lr)$. If $i \in \mathsf{HS}$, $\mathcal{B}$ computes $z_{lr,i} \leftarrow \tilde{z} - c\cdot\sum_{j\in\mathsf{cor}} L_j^{lr.\mathsf{SS}}\mathsf{ss}_j - \sum_{j\in\mathsf{hon}\setminus\{i\}} z_{lr,j} - \sum_{j\in\mathsf{cor}} \mathsf{mask}_{lr,j}$, and we do not need to compute $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ in this case. Otherwise, $\mathcal{B}$ computes $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i} \leftarrow \tilde{z} - c\cdot\sum_{j\in\mathsf{cor}\setminus\{i\}} L_j^{lr.\mathsf{SS}}\mathsf{ss}_j - \sum_{j\in\mathsf{hon}} z_{lr,j} - \sum_{j\in\mathsf{cor}\setminus\{i\}} \mathsf{mask}_{lr,j}$, and computes $z_{lr,i}$ the same as $\mathbf{G}_7$, where $\mathsf{hon} = \mathsf{HS} \cap lr.\mathsf{SS}$, $\mathsf{cor} = lr.\mathsf{SS}\setminus\mathsf{HS}$.

After $\mathcal{A}$ returns, $\mathcal{B}$ returns the output of $\mathcal{A}$.

Analysis of $\mathcal{B}$. First, to show that $\mathcal{B}$ simulates $\mathbf{G}_7$ perfectly, we only need to show that the distribution of the corrupted signing shares $\{\mathsf{ss}_i\}_{i\in\mathsf{CS}}$ and the value $z_{lr,i}$ computed in the simulation match those in $\mathbf{G}_7$, as these are the only places where the simulation deviates from the original game. Since ss_i is not used until $\mathcal{A}$ corrupts signer i, we can delay the sampling of ss_i until the query $\widetilde{\mathrm{Cor}}(i)$ is made. Then, since $\mathcal{A}$ can only corrupt up to $t-1$ signers and any subset of shares

with size less than t is uniformly random even given pk in $\mathbf{G}_7$, the distribution of the corrupted shares sampled by $\mathcal{B}$ is consistent with that in $\mathbf{G}_7$.

For $z_{lr,i}$ computed in $\mathsf{SampleMask}$ in case $\mathsf{hon} \subseteq \mathrm{curSS}(lr)$ and $i \in \mathsf{HS}$, from the Ideal-adp-UF game, we know $\tilde{z} = \sum_{j\in\mathsf{hon}}(r_{lr,j} + bs_{lr,j}) + c \cdot \widehat{\mathsf{sk}}$, where $\widehat{\mathsf{sk}}$ denotes sk in the Ideal-adp-UF game. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} z_{lr,i} &= \tilde{z} - c \cdot \sum_{j\in\mathsf{cor}} L_j^{lr.\mathsf{SS}}\mathsf{ss}_j - \sum_{j\in\mathsf{hon}\setminus\{i\}} z_{lr,j} - \sum_{j\in\mathsf{cor}} \mathsf{mask}_{lr,j} \\ &= \sum_{j\in\mathsf{hon}} (r_{lr,j} + bs_{lr,j}) + c \cdot \widehat{\mathsf{sk}} - c \cdot \sum_{j\in\mathsf{cor}} L_j^{lr.\mathsf{SS}}\mathsf{ss}_j - \sum_{j\in\mathsf{hon}} z_{lr,j} - \sum_{j\in\mathsf{cor}} \mathsf{mask}_{lr,j} \\ &= \sum_{j\in\mathsf{hon}} (r_{lr,j} + bs_{lr,j}) + c \cdot \left(\sum_{j\in\mathsf{hon}} L_j^{lr.\mathsf{SS}}\mathsf{ss}_j\right) - \sum_{j\in\mathsf{hon}\setminus\{i\}} z_{lr,j} - \sum_{j\in\mathsf{cor}} \mathsf{mask}_{lr,j} \ , \end{aligned}$$

which matches $\mathbf{G}_7$. Similarly, we can show the computation of $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$ matches $\mathbf{G}_7$. Therefore, $\mathcal{B}$ simulates $\mathbf{G}_7$ perfectly.

Also, from the simulation, a message μ is added to S in the Ideal-adp-UF game if and only if $\mathcal{A}$ makes a $\widetilde{\textsc{Cor}}$ or $\widetilde{\textsc{PSignO}}$ query such that after the query, there exists lr such that $lr.\mathsf{msg} = \mu$ and $(lr.\mathsf{SS} \cap \mathsf{HS}) \subseteq \mathrm{curSS}(lr)$. We note that once this condition holds during the execution of the game, it will continue to hold thereafter, since HS only shrinks and $\mathrm{curSS}(lr)$ only grows. Therefore, if $\mathcal{A}$ wins the game $\mathbf{G}_7$ simulated by $\mathcal{B}$, then $\mathcal{B}$ wins the Ideal-adp-UF game, which implies $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{G}_7}(\mathcal{A}, \kappa) = \mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ideal-adp-uf}}(\mathcal{B}, \kappa)$. Combining with the previous hybrids, we conclude the lemma. □

4.2 Proof of Lemma 2

We construct $\mathcal{B}$ as follows. Denote the challenges from the AOMDL game as $\mathsf{pk}, \{R_k, S_k\}_{k\in[\mathsf{q}_s]}$. To start with, $\mathcal{B}$ initializes the states $\{\mathsf{st}_i\}_{i\in[0..n]}$ follows the Ideal-adp-UF game and initializes the table H to an empty table. Also, $\mathcal{B}$ maintains the following tables and variables during the simulation:

- A table ctrPP is used to record for each nonce pair pp generated by some signer i, the index of the challenge corresponding to pp. It is initially set to an empty table.
- I_k denotes the challenges (R_k, S_k) is corresponds to a nonce pair generated by signer I_k.
- $\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}$ denotes the nonce pair for signer i in the leader request lr is the challenges $(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}, S_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}})$.
- A counter ctr_s denotes the index of the currently used challenge pairs, which is initially set to 0.
- A table curLR records for each index $k \in [\mathsf{q}_s]$, the $\widetilde{\textsc{PSignO}}$ query lr such that it contains the nonce pair (R_k, S_k). It is initially set to an empty table.
- A set LRset records the set of $\widetilde{\textsc{SignO}}$ queries from $\mathcal{A}$. It is initially set to an empty set.

Then, $\mathcal{B}$ runs $\mathcal{A}(\mathbb{G}, p, g, \mathsf{pk})$ with access to the oracles $\widetilde{\textsc{Cor}}$, $\widetilde{\textsc{PPO}}$ $\widetilde{\textsc{SignO}}$ and $\widetilde{\textsc{RO}}$, which are simulated as follows.

$\widetilde{\textsc{RO}}$ query $\mathrm{H}(x)$**:** The RO query is simulated using lazy sampling. If $\mathrm{H}(x) = \bot$, $\mathcal{B}$ sets $\mathrm{H}(x) \leftarrow\$ \mathbb{Z}_p$. Finally, $\mathcal{B}$ returns $\mathrm{H}_1(x)$.

$\widetilde{\textsc{PPO}}(i)$ query: $\mathcal{B}$ increases ctr_s by 1 and sets $pp \leftarrow (R_{\mathrm{ctr}_s}, S_{\mathrm{ctr}_s})$, $\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(pp) \leftarrow (\bot, \bot)$, $\mathrm{ctrPP}(i, pp) \leftarrow \mathrm{ctr}_s$, and $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{ctr}_s} \leftarrow i$. Finally, $\mathcal{B}$ returns pp.

$\widetilde{\text{SignO}}(lr)$ query: Same as in the Ideal-adp-UF game, except that if the oracle does not return $\perp$, $\mathcal{B}$ computes z by querying its own DLog oracle and adds lr to LRset. In particular, $\mathcal{B}$ sets $\beta_1 = c$. For each $i \in lr.\mathsf{SS} \cap \mathsf{HS}$, $\mathcal{B}$ sets $\mathrm{K}_{lr,i} = \mathrm{ctrPP}(i, lr.\mathsf{PP}(i))$, $\mathrm{curLR}(\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}) \leftarrow lr$, $\beta_{2\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}} \leftarrow 1$ and $\beta_{2\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}+1} \leftarrow b$. $\mathcal{B}$ sets $\beta_k \leftarrow 0$ for the rest of β_k. Then, $\mathcal{B}$ sets $z \leftarrow \mathrm{DLog}((\beta_k)_{k\in[2\mathsf{q}_s+1]})$.

$\widetilde{\text{Cor}}(i)$ query: Same as in the Ideal-adp-UF game, except that for each pp such that $\mathrm{ctrPP}(i, pp) \neq \perp$, $\mathcal{B}$ obtains the discrete logarithm (r_k, s_k) of (R_k, S_k) (where $k = \mathrm{ctrPP}(i, pp)$) by querying its own DLog oracle and sets $\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(pp) \leftarrow (r_k, s_k)$.

After $\mathcal{A}$ returns a valid forgery (μ^*, R^*, z^*), since $\mathcal{A}$ is algebraic, $\mathcal{A}$ also provides coefficients $\gamma^{(g)}, \gamma^{(\mathsf{pk})}, \{\gamma^{(R_k)}, \gamma^{(S_k)}\}_{k\in[\mathsf{q}_s]}$ such that

$$R^* = g^{\gamma^{(g)}} \mathsf{pk}^{\gamma^{(\mathsf{pk})}} \prod_{k\in[\mathsf{q}_s]} R_k^{\gamma^{(R_k)}} S_k^{\gamma^{(S_k)}} \ . \tag{2}$$

Before explaining how $\mathcal{B}$ wins the AOMDL game, we define a few more notations. In the following explanation, we use HS (resp. CS) to denote the set of honest (resp. corrupted) signers after $\mathcal{A}$ returns. For each $lr \in \mathrm{LRset}$, denote $(R_{lr}, c_{lr}, b_{lr}) \leftarrow \mathsf{CompPar}(\mathsf{pk}, lr)$ and z_{lr} as the response of the query lr to the oracle $\widetilde{\text{SignO}}$. By the simulation, $\prod_{\substack{i\in lr.\mathsf{SS}\cap\mathsf{HS}' \\ k=\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}} R_k S_k^{b_{lr}} = g^{z_{lr}} \mathsf{pk}^{c_{lr}}$, where HS' denotes the set of honest signers when the query lr is made. Denote $z'_{lr} = z_{lr} - \sum_{\substack{i\in(lr.\mathsf{SS}\cap\mathsf{HS}')\setminus\mathsf{HS} \\ k=\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}} (r_k + b_{lr} \cdot s_k)$. Note that z'_{lr} is computable by $\mathcal{B}$ since signer $i \in (lr.\mathsf{SS} \cap \mathsf{HS}')\setminus\mathsf{HS}$ is corrupted when $\mathcal{A}$ returns. Therefore,

$$\prod_{\substack{i\in lr.\mathsf{SS}\cap\mathsf{HS} \\ k=\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}} R_k S_k^{b_{lr}} = g^{z'_{lr}} \mathsf{pk}^{c_{lr}} \ . \tag{3}$$

Given the (valid) forgery, we have the following three cases in which the reduction $\mathcal{B}$ can win the AOMDL game.

Case 1: There exists an index $k^* \in [\mathsf{q}_s]$ such that $(\gamma^{(R_{k^*})}, \gamma^{(S_{k^*})}) \neq (0, 0)$, signer $\mathrm{I}_{k^*} \in \mathsf{HS}$ and $\mathrm{curLR}(k^*) = \perp$.
To solve all AOMDL challenges, $\mathcal{B}$ first obtains the secret key sk by querying its own DLog oracle. Then, $\mathcal{B}$ enumerates each $k \in [\mathsf{q}_s]$ that $k \neq k^*$ and $\mathrm{I}_k \in \mathsf{HS}$ and computes (r_k, s_k) as follows.[10] If $lr = \mathrm{curLR}(k) \neq \perp$ and all $\{(r_{k'}, s_{k'})\}_{\substack{i\in lr.\mathsf{SS}\cap\mathsf{HS} \\ k'=\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}, k'\neq k}}$ are computed, $\mathcal{B}$ first obtains s_i by querying its own DLog oracle and then computes s_k by Equation (3). Otherwise, $\mathcal{B}$ obtains (r_k, s_k) by querying its own DLog oracle twice.
Finally, to compute (r_{k^*}, s_{k^*}), since $g^{z^*} = R^* \mathsf{pk}^{c^*}$, where $c^* = \mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, R^*, \mu^*)$, by Equation (2), $\mathcal{B}$ computes δ such that $g^\delta = R^{\gamma^{(R_{k^*})}} S^{\gamma^{(S_{k^*})}}$. Thus, since $(\gamma^{(R_{k^*})}, \gamma^{(S_{k^*})}) \neq (0, 0)$, $\mathcal{B}$ only needs a single DLog query to compute the discrete logarithms of (R_{k^*}, S_{k^*}). Since $\mathcal{B}$ uses two DLog queries to compute (r_k, s_k) for each $k \neq k^* \in [\mathsf{q}_s]$ and one DLog query to compute sk, the total number of DLog queries made by $\mathcal{B}$ is $2\mathsf{q}_s$, which means that $\mathcal{B}$ wins the AOMDL game.

Case 2: There exists a leader request $lr \in \mathrm{LRset}$ such that either there exist $i, j \in lr.\mathsf{SS} \cap \mathsf{HS}$ such that $\gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)} \neq \gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,j}}\right)}$ or there exists $i \in lr.\mathsf{SS} \cap \mathsf{HS}$ such that $\gamma^{\left(S_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)} \neq b_{lr} \cdot \gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)}$.

[10] If $\mathrm{I}_k \in \mathsf{CS}$, (r_k, s_k) was computed when signer $\mathrm{I}(k)$ was corrupted and the number of DLog queries used is two.

For the former case, denote $k_1^* = \mathrm{K}_{lr,i}$ and $k_2^* = \mathrm{K}_{lr,j}$. $\mathcal{B}$ uses the same approach as in Case 1 to compute sk and $\{r_k, s_k\}_{k\in[\mathsf{q}_s]\setminus\{k_1^*,k_2^*\}}$. Then, $\mathcal{B}$ obtains $s_{k_1^*}$ and $s_{k_2^*}$ by querying its DLOG oracle twice. By Equation (2) and $g^{z^*} = R^*\mathsf{pk}^{c^*}$, $\mathcal{B}$ can compute δ_1 such that $g^{\delta_1} = R_{k_1^*}^{\gamma^{\left(R_{k_1^*}\right)}} R_{k_2^*}^{\gamma^{\left(R_{k_2^*}\right)}}$. By Equation (3), $\mathcal{B}$ can compute δ_2 such that $g^{\delta_2} = R_{k_1^*}S_{k_2^*}$. Since $\gamma^{\left(R_{k_1^*}\right)} \neq \gamma^{\left(R_{k_2^*}\right)}$, $\mathcal{B}$ can compute $(r_{k_1^*}, r_{k_2^*})$. We now count the number of DLOG queries made by $\mathcal{B}$. $\mathcal{B}$ uses two DLOG queries to compute (r_k, s_k) for each $k \in [\mathsf{q}_s]\setminus\{k_1^*, k_2^*\}$ and one DLOG query to compute sk. $\mathcal{B}$ needs two DLOG queries to compute $s_{k_1^*}$ and $s_{k_2^*}$ and one DLOG query to simulate $\textsc{SignO}(lr)$. Therefore, the total number of DLOG queries made by $\mathcal{B}$ is $2\mathsf{q}_s$, which means that $\mathcal{B}$ wins the AOMDL game.

For the latter case, denote $k^* = \mathrm{K}_{lr,i}$. $\mathcal{B}$ uses the same approach as in Case 1 to compute sk and $\{r_k, s_k\}_{k\in[\mathsf{q}_s]\setminus\{k^*\}}$. By Equation (2) and $g^{z^*} = R^*\mathsf{pk}^{c^*}$, $\mathcal{B}$ can compute δ_1 such that $g^{\delta_1} = R_{k^*}^{\gamma^{\left(R_{k^*}\right)}} S_{k^*}^{\gamma^{\left(S_{k^*}\right)}}$. By Equation (3), $\mathcal{B}$ can compute δ_2 such that $g^{\delta_2} = R_{k_1^*}S_{k_2^*}^{b_{lr}}$. Since $\gamma^{(S_{k^*})} \neq b_{lr}\gamma^{(R_{k^*})}$, $\mathcal{B}$ can compute (r_{k^*}, s_{k^*}). We now count the number of DLOG queries made by $\mathcal{B}$. $\mathcal{B}$ uses two DLOG queries to compute (r_k, s_k) for each $k \in [\mathsf{q}_s]\setminus\{k^*\}$ and one DLOG query to compute sk. Also, $\mathcal{B}$ needs one DLOG query to simulate $\textsc{SignO}(lr)$. Therefore, the total number of DLOG queries made by $\mathcal{B}$ is $2\mathsf{q}_s$, which means that $\mathcal{B}$ wins the AOMDL game.

Case 3: If both Case 1 and Case 2 do not occur, we know

- for each $k \in [\mathsf{q}_s]$ such that $(\gamma^{(R_k)}, \gamma^{(S_k)}) \neq (0,0)$ and signer $\mathrm{I}_k \in \mathsf{HS}$, $\mathrm{curLR}(k) \neq \perp$ (since Case 1 does not occur);
- for each $lr \in \mathrm{LRset}$, there exists $\gamma^{(lr)}$ such that for each $i \in lr.\mathsf{SS} \cap \mathsf{HS}$, $\gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)} = \gamma^{(lr)}$ and $\gamma^{\left(S_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)} = b_{lr}\cdot\gamma^{(lr)}$ (since Case 2 does not occur).

Therefore, for each $lr \in \mathrm{LRset}$, we know

$$\prod_{\substack{i\in lr.\mathsf{SS}\cap\mathsf{HS}\\ k=\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}} R_k^{\gamma^{(R_k)}} S_k^{\gamma^{(S_k)}} = \left(\prod_{\substack{i\in lr.\mathsf{SS}\cap\mathsf{HS}\\ k=\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}} R_k S_k^{b_{lr}}\right)^{\gamma^{(lr)}} = (g^{z'_{lr}}\mathsf{pk}^{c_{lr}})^{\gamma^{(lr)}} .$$

Since for each $k \in [\mathsf{q}_s]$ such that $\mathrm{I}_k \in \mathsf{CS}$, the discrete logarithm of (R_k, S_k) is known. By Equation (2),

$$R^* = g^{\gamma^{(g)} + \sum_{k\in[\mathsf{q}_s],\mathrm{I}_k\in\mathsf{CS}}(\gamma^{(R_k)}r_k + \gamma^{(S_k)}s_k) + \sum_{lr\in\mathrm{LRset}}\gamma^{(lr)}z'_{lr}}\mathsf{pk}^{\gamma^{(\mathsf{pk})} + \sum_{lr\in\mathrm{LRset}}\gamma^{(lr)}c_{lr}} .$$

Since (R^*, z^*) is a valid signature, $g^{z^*} = R^*\mathsf{pk}^{c^*}$, where $c^* = \mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, R^*, \mu^*)$. Therefore, if

$$c^* + \gamma^{(\mathsf{pk})} + \sum_{lr\in\mathrm{LRset}} \gamma^{(lr)}c_{lr} \neq 0 , \tag{4}$$

then $\mathcal{B}$ can compute the discrete logarithm of pk as

$$\mathsf{sk} \leftarrow \frac{z^* - \gamma^{(g)} + \sum_{k\in[\mathsf{q}_s],\mathrm{I}_k\in\mathsf{CS}}(\gamma^{(R_k)}r_k + \gamma^{(S_k)}s_k) + \sum_{lr\in\mathrm{LRset}}\gamma^{(lr)}z'_{lr}}{c^* + \gamma^{(\mathsf{pk})} + \sum_{lr\in\mathrm{LRset}}\gamma^{(lr)}c_{lr}} .$$

Game $\mathsf{wtROS}^{\mathcal{A}}_{n,t}(\kappa)$:

$\mathrm{ctr}_{\mathrm{ss}} \leftarrow 0$
$(\mathcal{Q}, \mathsf{CS}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\textsc{Init},\textsc{Regist},\mathrm{RO}}(1^\kappa)$
Assert $\mathcal{Q}$ is a list of length $\leqslant \mathrm{ctr}_{\mathrm{ss}}$
Assert $|\mathsf{CS}| \leqslant t-1$
For $i \in |\mathcal{Q}|$ do
  Assert $\mathcal{Q}[i]$ is of the form $\{(\gamma \in \mathbb{Z}_p, T \subseteq \mathsf{SS}_i)\}$
  Assert $\forall (\gamma, T) \neq (\gamma', T') \in \mathcal{Q}[i] : \gamma \neq \gamma' \wedge T \cap T' = \varnothing$
  Assert $\left(\exists (\gamma, T) \in \mathcal{Q}[i] : \mathsf{SS}_i \backslash T \subseteq \mathsf{CS}\right) \vee \left(\forall (\gamma, T) \in \mathcal{Q}[i] : T \subseteq \mathsf{CS}\right)$
Return $\left(\sum_{i \in [\mathrm{ctr}_{\mathrm{ss}}], (\gamma, T) \in \mathcal{Q}[i]} \mathbf{1}\left\{\mathsf{SS}_i \backslash T \subseteq \mathsf{CS}\right\} \gamma c_i = \mathrm{H}(\mathcal{Q})\right)$

Oracle $\textsc{Regist}(\overline{\mathsf{SS}}, c)$:

Require: $\overline{\mathsf{SS}} \subseteq [n]$ and $\left|\overline{\mathsf{SS}}\right| \geqslant t$
$\mathrm{ctr}_{\mathrm{ss}} \leftarrow \mathrm{ctr}_{\mathrm{ss}} + 1$
$\mathsf{SS}_{\mathrm{ctr}_{\mathrm{ss}}} \leftarrow \overline{\mathsf{SS}}$
$c_{\mathrm{ctr}_{\mathrm{ss}}} \leftarrow c$

Oracle $\mathrm{RO}(x)$:

Assert x is a list of length $\leqslant \mathrm{ctr}_{\mathrm{ss}}$
If $\mathrm{H}(x) = \perp$ then
  $\mathrm{H}(x) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_p$
Return $\mathrm{H}(x)$

Fig. 6. The wtROS game. The assert statement returns 0 if the following condition is not met. The random oracle RO performs a format check on the input.

Then, $\mathcal{B}$ computes $\{(r_k, s_k)\}_{k \in [\mathsf{q}_s]}$ using the same approach as Case 1. Since $\mathcal{B}$ uses two DLog queries for each (r_k, s_k), the total number of DLog queries is $2\mathsf{q}_s$, which means $\mathcal{B}$ wins the AOMDL game. To be clear, Case 3 is referred to the event that Case 1 and Case 2 do not occur and Equation (4) holds.

Finally, denote ExFail as the event that $\mathcal{A}$ wins the Ideal-adp-UF game but all three cases do not occur. Then, we can conclude the lemma from the following claim and the hardness of wtROS (Lemma 3).

Claim. There exists an adversary $\mathcal{C}$ playing the wtROS game (defined in Figure 6) such that $\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{ExFail}] \leqslant \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{wtros}}(\mathcal{C}, \kappa) + \mathsf{q}_h^2 \cdot 2^{-\kappa}$.

Proof. We construct $\mathcal{C}$ as follows. $\mathcal{C}$ runs $\mathcal{A}$ by simulating the Ideal-adp-UF game faithfully except the random oracle queries are simulated as follows. Here we use the following convenient notations similar as $\mathcal{B}$: (R_k, S_k) denotes the k-th generated nonce pair; I_k denotes the index of the signer that generates the k-th nonce pair; $\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}$ denotes the index such that $lr.\mathsf{PP}(i) = (R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}, S_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}})$ ($\mathrm{K}_{lr,i} = \perp$ if such index does not exist); b_{lr} denotes $\mathrm{H}_1(\mathsf{pk}, lr)$; $lr^{(j)}$ denotes the j-th leader request; J_{lr} denotes the index such that $lr^{(\mathrm{J}_{lr})} = lr$ ($\mathrm{J}_{lr} = \perp$ if such index does not exist) ; LRset records the set of SignO queries from $\mathcal{A}$, which is initially an empty set.

$\widetilde{\mathbf{RO}}$ query $\mathrm{H}_1(x)$**:** If $\mathrm{H}_1(x) \neq \perp$, then $\mathcal{C}$ returns $\mathrm{H}_1(x)$. Otherwise, $\mathcal{C}$ parses x as $(\widetilde{\mathsf{pk}}, lr)$. If $\widetilde{\mathsf{pk}} \neq \mathsf{pk}$, $\mathcal{C}$ sets $\mathrm{H}_1(x) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_p$ and returns $\mathrm{H}_1(x)$. Otherwise, $\mathcal{C}$ increases ctr_l by 1 and sets $\mathrm{J}_{lr} \leftarrow \mathrm{ctr}_l$. (Here ctr_l is used to count the number of leader requests and initially set to 0.) Then, $\mathcal{C}$ samples $b_{lr} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sets $\mathrm{H}_1(x) \leftarrow b_{lr}$. Also, $\mathcal{C}$ computes $\overline{R} \leftarrow \prod_{i \in [lr.\mathsf{SS}]} R_i S_i^{b_{lr}}$, where $(R_i, S_i) \leftarrow lr.\mathsf{PP}(i)$, and queries $\widetilde{\mathrm{RO}}(2, \mathsf{pk}, \overline{R}, lr.\mathsf{msg})$. Finally, $\mathcal{C}$ registers the query by invoking $\textsc{Regist}(lr.\mathsf{SS}, H_2(\mathsf{pk}, \overline{R}, lr.\mathsf{msg}))$.

$\widetilde{\mathbf{RO}}$ query $\mathrm{H}_2(x)$**:** If $\mathrm{H}_2(x) \neq \perp$, then $\mathcal{C}$ returns $\mathrm{H}_2(x)$. Otherwise, $\mathcal{C}$ parses x as $(\widetilde{\mathsf{pk}}, R, \mu)$. If $\widetilde{\mathsf{pk}} \neq \mathsf{pk}$, $\mathcal{C}$ sets $\mathrm{H}_2(x) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_p$ and returns $\mathrm{H}_2(x)$. Otherwise, since $\mathcal{A}$ is algebraic, $\mathcal{A}$ also provides coefficients $\gamma^{(g)}, \gamma^{(\mathsf{pk})}, \{\gamma^{(R_k)}, \gamma^{(S_k)}\}_{k \in [\mathsf{q}_s]}$ such that

$$R = g^{\gamma^{(g)}} \mathsf{pk}^{\gamma^{(\mathsf{pk})}} \prod_{k \in [\mathsf{q}_s]} R_k^{\gamma^{(R_k)}} S_k^{\gamma^{(S_k)}} \ . \tag{5}$$

$\mathcal{C}$ initializes $\mathcal{Q}$ as a list of empty sets. For each $j \in \mathrm{ctr}_l$, we denote $lr = lr^{(j)}$ and $T_{lr} := \{i \in lr.\mathsf{SS} : b_{lr} \cdot \gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)} = \gamma^{\left(S_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)} \wedge (\gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)}, \gamma^{\left(S_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)}) \neq (0,0)\}$. For each $i \in T_{lr}$, $\mathcal{C}$ adds $(\gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)}, \{i' \in T_{lr} : \gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)} = \gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i'}}\right)}\})$ to $\mathcal{Q}[j]$. Finally, $\mathcal{C}$ queries its own random oracle $\mathrm{H}_2(x) \leftarrow -\mathrm{RO}(\mathcal{Q}) - \gamma^{(\mathsf{pk})}$ and returns $\mathrm{H}_2(x)$.

After $\mathcal{A}$ returns a valid forgery $(\mu^*, (R^*, z^*))$, $\mathcal{C}$ retrieves the $\mathcal{Q}^*$ defined during the simulation of the query $\widetilde{\mathrm{RO}}(\mathsf{pk}, R^*, \mu^*)$ and returns $(\mathcal{Q}, \mathsf{CS})$.

It is clear that $\mathcal{C}$ simulates the Ideal-adp-UF game perfectly. It is left to show $\mathcal{C}$ wins the wtROS game if the event ExFail occurs when $\mathcal{A}$ plays the Ideal-adp-UF game simulated by the adversary $\mathcal{C}$. By the simulation, for each $j \in |\mathcal{Q}|$, denoting $lr = lr^{(j)}$, we know that SS_j in the wtROS game is equal to $lr.\mathsf{SS}$ and $\mathcal{Q}[j]$ is of the form $\{(\gamma \in \mathbb{Z}_p, T \subseteq lr.\mathsf{SS})\}$. Also, for each $(\gamma, T) \neq (\gamma', T') \in \mathcal{Q}[j]$, it holds that $\gamma \neq \gamma'$ and $T \cap T' = \varnothing$.

We now show that either $\exists\ (\gamma, T) \in \mathcal{Q}[j] : SS_j \backslash T \subseteq \mathsf{CS}$ or $\forall\ (\gamma, T) \in \mathcal{Q}[j] : T \subseteq \mathsf{CS}$. Suppose the statement does not hold. Then, there exists $(\gamma, T) \in \mathcal{Q}[j]$ such that $T \nsubseteq \mathsf{CS}$ and $SS_j \backslash T \nsubseteq \mathsf{CS}$. Therefore, there exists $i_1 \in T \backslash \mathsf{CS}$ and $i_2 \in SS_j \backslash \{\mathsf{CS} \cup T\}$. Since $i_1 \in T$ but $i_2 \notin T$, we have $i_1 \neq i_2$. Also, by the construction of $\mathcal{Q}[j]$, we have $(\gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i_1}}\right)}, \gamma^{\left(S_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i_1}}\right)}) = (\gamma, b_{lr}\gamma)$, and $(\gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i_2}}\right)}, \gamma^{\left(S_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i_2}}\right)}) \neq (\gamma, b_{lr}\gamma)$. Since $i_1, i_2 \in SS \cap \mathsf{HS}$, it implies either $\gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i_1}}\right)} \neq \gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i_2}}\right)}$ or $\gamma^{\left(S_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i_2}}\right)} \neq b_{lr}\gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i_2}}\right)}$. Therefore, Case 2 occurs, which yields a contradiction.

It is left to show that $\mathcal{Q}$ satisfies the final winning condition. If $lr \notin \mathrm{LRset}$, we can show that $\mathcal{Q}[j] = \varnothing$ except for negligible probability. Suppose $\mathcal{Q}[j] \neq \varnothing$. Then, there exists $i \in lr.\mathsf{SS}$ such that $(\gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)}, \gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)}) \neq (0,0)$ and $\gamma^{\left(S_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)} = b_{lr}\gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)}$. Since Case 1 does not occur, there exists $lr' \in \mathrm{LRset}$ such that $\gamma^{\left(S_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)} = b_{lr'}\gamma^{\left(R_{\mathrm{K}_{lr,i}}\right)}$. However, since $lr \neq lr'$, the probability that $b_{lr'} = b_{lr}$ is at most q_h^2/p.

If $lr \in \mathrm{LRset}$, since both Case 1 and Case do not occur, $\mathcal{Q}[j]$ consists of a single element $\{(\gamma^{(lr)}, lr.\mathsf{SS} \cap \mathsf{HS})\}$, where $\gamma^{(lr)}$ is defined in Case 3 above. Therefore,

$$\sum_{j \in [\mathrm{ctr}_{\mathrm{ss}}], (\gamma, T) \in \mathcal{Q}[j]} \mathbf{1}\left\{\mathsf{SS}_j \backslash T \subseteq \mathsf{CS}\right\} \gamma c_j = \sum_{lr \in \mathrm{LRset}} \gamma^{(lr)} c_{lr}.$$

Since Case 3 does not occur, Equation (4) does not hold, which implies

$$\sum_{j \in [\mathrm{ctr}_{\mathrm{ss}}], (\gamma, T) \in \mathcal{Q}[j]} \mathbf{1}\left\{\mathsf{SS}_j \backslash T \subseteq \mathsf{CS}\right\} \gamma c_j = -\mathrm{H}_2(\mathsf{pk}, R^*, \mu^*) - \gamma^{(\mathsf{pk})} = \mathrm{RO}(\mathcal{Q})\ .$$

Therefore, $\mathcal{C}$ wins the wtROS game and thus $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{wtros}}(\mathcal{C}, \kappa) \geqslant \mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{ExFail}] - \mathsf{q}_h^2/p$. □

4.3 Hardness of wtROS

We prove the following lemma, which shows that wtROS is unconditionally hard.

Lemma 3. *For any adversary $\mathcal{C}$ that makes at most q_h queries to the random oracle, we have $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{wtros}}_{n,t}(\mathcal{C}, \kappa) \leqslant \mathsf{q}_h t/2^{\kappa}$.*

Proof. For any $t \geqslant 0$, we say that a list of sets $\mathsf{RSS} := \{\mathsf{SS}_i\}_{i\in[\mathrm{ctr}_{ss}]}$ is valid with respect to t if they are possible registered sets in $\mathsf{wtROS}(\kappa, n, t)$. Namely, for every SS_i in RSS, we have $|\mathsf{SS}_i| \geqslant t$.

Fix a valid $\mathsf{RSS} = \{\mathsf{SS}_i\}_{i\in[\mathrm{ctr}_{ss}]}$ for t, we say $\mathcal{Q}$ is valid with respect to (t, RSS) if it does not violate the winning conditions of $\mathsf{wtROS}(\kappa, n, t)$ with RSS being the registered sets. Namely, for every $i \in [\mathrm{ctr}_{ss}]$: For all $(\gamma, T) \in \mathcal{Q}[i]$, T is a subset of SS_i; for all $(\gamma, T) \neq (\gamma', T') \in \mathcal{Q}[i]$, $\gamma \neq \gamma'$, and $T \cap T' = \varnothing$.

Fix valid RSS for $\mathcal{Q}$, we say a corrupted set CS is valid with respect to $(t, \mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q})$ if it does not violate the following winning conditions of $\mathsf{wtROS}(\kappa, n, t)$ when output together with $\mathcal{Q}$ and with RSS being the registered sets: $|\mathsf{CS}| \leqslant t - 1$; for every $i \in [\mathrm{ctr}_{ss}]$, there exists a $(\gamma, T) \in \mathcal{Q}[i]$ such that $\mathsf{SS}_i \backslash T \subseteq \mathsf{CS}$, or $T \subseteq \mathsf{CS}$ for every $(\gamma, T) \in \mathcal{Q}[i]$.

We note that for any empty $\mathcal{Q}[i]$, it trivially holds that $T \subseteq \mathsf{CS}$ for every $(\gamma, T) \in \mathcal{Q}[i]$. When the corresponding t (and RSS, $\mathcal{Q}$) are clear in the context, we will simply say the RSS (or $\mathcal{Q}$, CS) are valid.

The winning conditions of $\mathsf{wtROS}(\kappa, n, t)$ say that $\mathcal{C}$ wins the game if and only if it registered a valid list of sets $\mathsf{RSS} = \{\mathsf{SS}_i\}_{i\in[\mathrm{ctr}_{ss}]}$, outputs valid $\mathcal{Q}$ and CS, such that

$$\sum_{i\in[\mathrm{ctr}_{ss}],(\gamma,T)\in\mathcal{Q}[i]} \mathbf{1}\left\{T \nsubseteq \mathsf{CS}\right\} \gamma c_i = \mathrm{H}(\mathcal{Q}).$$

We will show that, for every valid RSS and $\mathcal{Q}$,

$$\left| \left\{ \sum_{i\in[\mathrm{ctr}_{ss}],(\gamma,T)\in\mathcal{Q}[i]} \mathbf{1}\left\{\mathsf{SS}_i \backslash T \subseteq \mathsf{CS}\right\} \gamma c_i : \mathsf{CS} \text{ is valid} \right\} \right| \leqslant t.$$

Namely, we check every valid CS and count how many possible values of $\sum_{i\in[\mathrm{ctr}_{ss}],(\gamma,T)\in\mathcal{Q}[i]} \mathbf{1}\left\{T \nsubseteq \mathsf{CS}\right\} \gamma c_i$ there are. Only if $\mathrm{H}(\mathcal{Q})$ hits one of these values, then there exists a CS such that $\mathcal{C}$ can win by outputting $(\mathcal{Q}, \mathsf{CS})$. Then our claim follows.

FUNCTIONS f AND F. From now on, denote the length of RSS and $\mathcal{Q}$ by m instead of ctr_{ss}. Suppose that for each $i \in [m]$, $\mathcal{Q}[i]$ consists of l_i tuples $\{(\gamma_{i,j}, T_{i,j})\}_{j\in[l_i]}$. For $\mathcal{Q}$ to be valid, these $\{T_{i,j}\}_{j\in[l_i]}$ must be disjoint subsets of SS_i. With respect to $\mathcal{Q}$, we define $T_{i,0}$ to be $\mathsf{SS}_i \backslash (\cap_{j\in[l_i]} T_{i,j})$ for every $i \in [m]$. Then $\{T_{i,j}\}_{j=0}^{l_i}$ is a partitioning for SS_i. The second condition of the validity of CS can be written as: For every $i \in [m]$, there exists a $j \in \{0, \ldots, l_i\}$ such that $\mathsf{SS}_i \backslash T_{i,j} \subseteq \mathsf{CS}$.

We note that such j is unique if it exists. Otherwise, we would find that CS covers the whole SS_i, which is impossible since $|\mathsf{CS}| \leqslant t - 1 < |\mathsf{SS}_i|$. Let function f, taking valid RSS, $\mathcal{Q}$, CS as inputs, indicate this unique j:

$$f(\mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q}, \mathsf{CS}, i) = j \quad \text{where } \mathsf{SS}_i \backslash T_{i,j} \subseteq \mathsf{CS}$$

We leave f undefined over invalid CS. Define $\gamma_{i,0}$ to be always 0. Then we have

$$\sum_{i\in[m],(\gamma,T)\in\mathcal{Q}[i]} \mathbf{1}\left\{\mathsf{SS}_i \backslash T \subseteq \mathsf{CS}\right\} \gamma c_i = \sum_{i\in[m]} \gamma_{i,f(\mathsf{RSS},\mathcal{Q},\mathsf{CS},i)} \cdot c_i.$$

The number of possible values of this sum is upper-bounded by the number of possible values of concatenation (i.e., ordered list) $\{\gamma_{i,f(\mathsf{RSS},\mathcal{Q},\mathsf{CS},i)} \cdot c_i\}_{i\in[m]}$. It can be upper-bounded further by the number of possible values of concatenation

$$\{f(\mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q}, \mathsf{CS}, i)\}_{i\in[m]}.$$

Let $F(t, \mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q})$ denote this number:

$$F(t, \mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q}) := \left| \left\{ \{f(\mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q}, \mathsf{CS}, i)\}_{i\in[m]} : \mathsf{CS} \text{ is valid} \right\} \right|.$$

Here F takes t as an input as the validity of CS is defined with respect to t.

Upper bound of F. We claim that $F(t, \mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q}) \leqslant t$ for every $1 \leqslant t \leqslant n$, every valid RSS for t, every valid $\mathcal{Q}$ for t and RSS.

We prove this claim by induction on m. The base case is $m = 0$, where the concatenation can only be $\varnothing$, so we have $F(t, \mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q}) = 1 \leqslant t$.

For the inductive step, we derive a recurrence relation. Define $F(t, \mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q})\big|_k$ to be the number of possible values of $\{f(\mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q}, \mathsf{CS}, i)\}_{i\in[m]}$ with $f(\mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q}, \mathsf{CS}, 1)$ fixed to be k, namely

$$\left| \left\{ \{f(\mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q}, \mathsf{CS}, i)\}_{i\in[m]} : \mathsf{CS} \text{ is valid} \wedge f(\mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q}, \mathsf{CS}, 1) = k \right\} \right|.$$

Then clearly, we have $F(t, \mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q}) = \sum_{k=0}^{l_1} F(t, \mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q})\big|_k$.

For $f(\mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q}, \mathsf{CS}, 1)$ to be k, CS must contain $\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}$. Then there remain $t - 1 - |\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}|$ elements to include in CS. It remains to consider $\{\mathsf{SS}_i\}_{i=2}^m$ and $\{\mathcal{Q}[i]\}_{i=2}^m$ with $\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}$ removed. Namely, define $\mathsf{RSS}\big|_W := \{\mathsf{SS}_i\backslash W\}_{i=2}^m$ and $\mathcal{Q}\big|_W := \{\mathcal{Q}[i]\big|_W\}_{i=2}^m$, where $\mathcal{Q}[i]\big|_W := \{(\gamma_{i,j}, T_{i,j}\backslash W)\}_{j\in[l_i]}$. Then we have

$$F(t, \mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q})\big|_j = \begin{cases} 0, & |\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}| > t - 1 \\ F(t - |\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}|, \mathsf{RSS}\big|_{\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}}, \mathcal{Q}\big|_{\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}}), & |\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}| \leqslant t - 1. \end{cases}$$

Note that every set in $\mathsf{RSS}\big|_{\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}}$ is of size at least $t - |\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}|$, so $\mathsf{RSS}\big|_{\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}}$ is valid with respect to $t - |\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}|$. Also, as $\{T_{i,j}\backslash(\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k})\}_{j\in[l_i]}$ stay disjoint, the validity of $\mathcal{Q}\big|_{\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}}$ is maintained. Note that the validity of $\mathcal{Q}$ does not require $T_{i,j}$ to be non-empty.

Assume that $F(t', \mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q}) \leqslant t'$ holds for every $1 \leqslant t' \leqslant n$ and every valid RSS and $\mathcal{Q}$ of size $m' \leqslant m - 1$. Let K denote $\{k \in \{0, \ldots, l_1\} : \mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k} \leqslant t - 1\}$. If $|K| = 0$, we immediately have $F(t, \mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q}) = 0 < t$. If $|K| \geqslant 1$, then we have

$$\begin{aligned} F(t, \mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q}) = \sum_{k\in K} F(t, \mathsf{RSS}, \mathcal{Q})\big|_k &= \sum_{k\in K} F(t - |\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}|, \mathsf{RSS}\big|_{\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}}, \mathcal{Q}\big|_{\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}}) \\ &\leqslant \sum_{k\in K} (t - |\mathsf{SS}_1\backslash T_{1,k}|) = \sum_{k\in K} (t - |\mathsf{SS}_1| + |T_{1,k}|) \\ &= |K|\,(t - |\mathsf{SS}_1|) + \sum_{k\in K} |T_{1,k}| \leqslant |K|\,(t - |\mathsf{SS}_1|) + |\mathsf{SS}_1| \\ &= |K|\,t - (|K| - 1)\,|\mathsf{SS}_1| \leqslant t. \end{aligned}$$

In the first inequality, we have used the inductive assumption. In the second inequality, we have used that $\{T_{1,k}\}_{k=0}^{l_1}$ are disjoint partitions of SS_1. In the last inequality, we have used that $|\mathsf{SS}_1| \geqslant t$. □

5 Impossibility Results

We complement our AGM result by showing that, in the ROM only, it is not possible to prove the adaptive security of ms-FROST via *algebraic black-box* reduction under the AOMDL assumption even for the weakest security level (adp-TS-UF-0). We start by explaining the notion of algebraic reductions and then present the theorem we show.

ALGEBRAIC BLACK-BOX REDUCTION. We say $\mathcal{B}$ is an *algebraic black-box reduction* from a game $\mathbf{G}_A$ to another game $\mathbf{G}_B$ if and only if for any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that wins the game $\mathbf{G}_B$ with non-negligible probability, $\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{A}}$ is an adversary with black box access $\mathcal{A}$ such that $\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{A}}$ wins the game $\mathbf{G}_A$ with non-negligible probability. For a reduction $\mathcal{B}$ from the AOMDL game, we say $\mathcal{B}$ is *algebraic* if and only if

- $\mathcal{B}$ neither generates nor sends $\mathcal{A}$ any group description other than $(\mathbb{G}, p, g)$ provided by the AOMDL game. [11]
- Whenever $\mathcal{B}$ outputs or sends to $\mathcal{A}$ a group element Z, $\mathcal{B}$ also outputs a representation $\alpha, \{\beta_i\}, \{\gamma_i\}$ of Z using the group generator g, AOMDL challenges $\{X_i\}$, and the group elements $\{Y_j\}$ received from $\mathcal{A}$ such that $Z = g^{\alpha} \prod_i X_i^{\beta_i} \prod_j Y_j^{\gamma_j}$.

Note that such reductions have been introduced and studied in prior works [BFL20, BL22], and we provide only an informal description here.

Theorem 2. *For any group generation algorithm* GGen *and any algebraic reduction* $\mathcal{B}$ *that reduces the* AOMDL *game to the* adp-TS-UF-$0_{\mathsf{ms\text{-}FROST[GGen]}}$ *game, there exists an adversary* $\mathcal{A}$ *that wins the* adp-TS-UF-$0_{\mathsf{ms\text{-}FROST[GGen]}}$ *game with probability 1 and an adversary* $\mathcal{M}$ *playing the* AOMDL *game such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{aomdl}}_{\mathsf{GGen}}(\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{A}}, \kappa) \leqslant \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{aomdl}}_{\mathsf{GGen}}(\mathcal{M}, \kappa) + \mathsf{q}/\binom{n}{t-1},$$

where q *denotes the number of invocation of* $\mathcal{A}$ *by* $\mathcal{B}$.

The proof sketch can be described as follows. The first step is to construct an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ such that, if $\mathcal{B}$ rewinds $\mathcal{A}$, the views of the two executions reveal the secret key with high probability. A more detailed explanation and the construction of $\mathcal{A}$ can be found in Section 2.2.

Next, we build an AOMDL adversary $\mathcal{M}$ that internally runs $\mathcal{B}$ by simulating both the AOMDL game and black-box access to $\mathcal{A}$. To simulate the AOMDL game for $\mathcal{B}$, $\mathcal{M}$ simply forwards all oracle queries from $\mathcal{B}$ to the AOMDL challenger. The simulation of $\mathcal{A}$ works as follows. For simplicity, let us consider the simpler case in which $\mathcal{B}$ first runs $\mathcal{A}$ once with public key pk and then either returns or rewinds $\mathcal{A}$ to the point of the random-oracle query $\mathrm{H}_1(\mathsf{pk}, R, \mu)$.

For the first execution, $\mathcal{M}$ sets R^* to be the AOMDL challenge and obtains the forgery z^* by querying its DLOG oracle. If $\mathcal{B}$ rewinds, then by the property of $\mathcal{A}$ described above, $\mathcal{M}$ can extract the discrete logarithm sk of pk, and thus compute the forgery z^* directly using sk. Finally, after $\mathcal{B}$ returns, if $\mathcal{B}$ wins the AOMDL game simulated by $\mathcal{M}$, since $\mathcal{B}$ is algebraic, $\mathcal{M}$ can compute the discrete logarithm of pk no matter whether $\mathcal{B}$ rewinds or not. Then, $\mathcal{M}$ can solve the discrete

[11] In principle, $\mathcal{B}$ might send the group description to $\mathcal{A}$ with a different group generator. However, for simplicity, we do not allow this here. If we were to allow this behavior, we would need a stronger variant of the OMDL assumption, where the DLOG oracle can return the discrete logarithm of a group element with respect to any base, to show the impossibility result.

logarithm of R^* using sk. Since $\mathcal{M}$ solved one extra challenge and made one extra DLog query, $\mathcal{M}$ wins the AOMDL game.

We remark that the proof idea is similar to the recent work of Crites et al. [CKM25]. However, their result only considers reductions that rewind $\mathcal{A}$ exactly once, while our argument extends to general reductions.

Proof (of Theorem 2). We first construct a class of deterministic adversaries $\mathcal{A}^\rho$ parametrized by its randomness $\rho \in \Gamma$. Here $\mathcal{A}^\rho$ might not be efficient. Then, we construct $\mathcal{M}$ running $\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{A}'}$, where $\mathcal{A}'$ is an adversary simulated by $\mathcal{M}$ that provides $\mathcal{B}$ with the same view as $\mathcal{A}^\rho$ for ρ uniformly sampled from Γ, such that $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{aomdl}}_{\mathsf{GGen}}(\mathcal{M},\kappa) \geqslant \mathsf{E}_{\rho \leftarrow\!\$\, \Gamma}[\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{aomdl}}_{\mathsf{GGen}}(\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{A}^\rho},\kappa)] - \mathsf{q}/\binom{n}{t-1}$. Therefore, we can conclude the theorem since there exists $\rho_0 \in \Gamma$ such that $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{aomdl}}_{\mathsf{GGen}}(\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{A}^{\rho_0}},\kappa) \leqslant \mathsf{E}_{\rho \leftarrow\!\$\, \Gamma}[\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{aomdl}}_{\mathsf{GGen}}(\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{A}^\rho},\kappa)]$. Note that here $\mathcal{B}$ is given a deterministic $\mathcal{A}^\rho$ instead of a randomized $\mathcal{A}$ with randomness chosen by $\mathcal{B}$.

Construction of $\mathcal{A}^\rho$. After receiving $(\mathbb{G}, p, g, \mathsf{pk})$, $\mathcal{A}$ computes two functions $\mathsf{F}_1 : \mathbb{G}^{2n+1} \to \mathbb{G}$ and $\mathsf{F}_2 : \mathbb{Z}_p \to \{T \subseteq [n] : |T| = t-1\}$ using its randomness ρ such that $\mathsf{F}_1, \mathsf{F}_2$ are truly random functions given ρ is uniformly sampled from Γ. Then, $\mathcal{A}$ executes as follows.

1. $\mathcal{A}$ queries $(R_i, S_i) \leftarrow \mathrm{PPO}(i)$ for each $i \in [n]$.
2. $\mathcal{A}$ computes $R^* \leftarrow \mathsf{F}_1(\mathsf{pk}, R_1, S_1, \ldots, R_n, S_n)$ and queries $c^* \leftarrow \mathrm{RO}(\texttt{'2'}, \mathsf{pk}, \mu^*, R^*)$, where $\mu^* \leftarrow 0$.
3. $\mathcal{A}$ computes $\mathsf{CS} \leftarrow \mathsf{F}_2(c^*)$ and corrupts each $i \in \mathsf{CS}$. For each $i \in \mathsf{CS}$, after $\mathcal{A}$ receiving st_i from the oracle query $\mathrm{Cor}(i)$, it sets $(\mathsf{ss}_i, \{\mathsf{seed}_{i,j}, \mathsf{seed}_{j,i}\}_{j\in[n]}) \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_i.\mathsf{sk}$ and $(r_i, s_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_i.\mathsf{PP}(R_i, S_i)$ and **aborts** if $R_i \neq g^{r_i}$ or $S_i \neq g^{s_i}$.
4. For each $i \in [n]\backslash\mathsf{CS}$, $\mathcal{A}$ computes $lr^{(i)}$ such that $lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{msg} \leftarrow \mu_0$, where $\mu_0 \leftarrow 1$, $lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{SS} \leftarrow \mathsf{CS} \cup \{i\}$, and $lr^{(j)}.\mathsf{PP}(j) \leftarrow (R_j, S_j)$ for $j \in lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{SS}$. Then, $\mathcal{A}$ queries $\mathrm{PSignO}(lr) \to z^{(i)}$ and **aborts** if $z^{(i)}$ is *not correct*. In particular, $\mathcal{A}$ computes $\mathsf{mask}^{(i)} \leftarrow \sum_{j\in\mathsf{CS}}(\mathrm{RO}(\texttt{'m'}, \mathsf{seed}_{i,j}, \mathsf{pk}, lr^{(i)}) - \mathrm{RO}(\texttt{'m'}, \mathsf{seed}_{j,i}, \mathsf{pk}, lr^{(i)}))$ and $\bar{z}^{(i)} \leftarrow z^{(i)} - \mathsf{mask}^{(i)} + \sum_{j\in\mathsf{CS}} c^{(i)} L_j^{lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{SS}} \mathsf{ss}_j$, and aborts if $g^{\bar{z}^{(i)}} \neq R_i S_i^{b^{(i)}} \mathsf{pk}^{c^{(i)}}$, where $b^{(i)}$ and $c^{(i)}$ is computed as in $\mathsf{CompPar}(\mathsf{pk}, lr^{(i)})$.
5. Finally, $\mathcal{A}$ computes $z^* \leftarrow \mathrm{DLog}_g(R^* \mathsf{pk}^{c^*})$ and outputs $(\mu^*, (R^*, z^*))$. Note that this step can be done using an exhaustive search.

We first show that $\mathcal{A}^\rho$ does not abort while playing the adp-TS-UF-0 game is executed honestly. It is clear that $\mathcal{A}$ does not abort in step 3. In step 4, by the game description, $z^{(i)} = r_i + b^{(i)} s_i + c^{(i)} L_i^{lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{SS}} \mathsf{ss}_i + \mathsf{mask}^{(i)}$. Since $g^{L_i^{lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{SS}} \mathsf{ss}_i + \sum_{j\in\mathsf{CS}} L_j^{lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{SS}} \mathsf{ss}_j} = g^{\sum_{j\in lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{SS}} L_j^{lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{SS}} \mathsf{ss}_j} = \mathsf{pk}$, it holds that

$$g^{\bar{z}^{(i)}} = g^{r_i + b^{(i)} s_i + c^{(i)}(L_i^{lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{SS}} \mathsf{ss}_i + \sum_{j\in\mathsf{CS}} L_j^{lr^{(i)}.\mathsf{SS}} \mathsf{ss}_j)} = R_i S_i^{b^{(i)}} \mathsf{pk}^{c^{(i)}} .$$

Therefore, $\mathcal{A}^\rho$ does not abort while playing the adp-TS-UF-0 game. Since $\mu^* \neq \mu_0$ and the signature output by $\mathcal{A}^\rho$ is always valid, $\mathcal{A}^\rho$ wins the adp-TS-UF-0 game with probability 1.

Construction of $\mathcal{M}$. After receiving $(\mathbb{G}, p, g)$ from the AOMDL game, $\mathcal{M}$ runs $\mathcal{B}$ with black-box access to an adversary $\mathcal{A}'$ simulated by $\mathcal{M}$ and access to oracles Chal and DLog, which are directly forwarded to $\mathcal{M}$'s own Chal and DLog oracles. Let us index the challenges generated due to $\mathcal{B}$'s Chal queries as $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_i$ and index the challenges queried by $\mathcal{M}$ itself as $X_{-1}, X_{-2}, \ldots, X_{-i}$. $\mathcal{M}$ maintains a map curInst to record all the invocations of $\mathcal{A}'$, which is initially empty. $\mathcal{M}$ also maintains a table T_2 that simulates the truly random function F_2 by lazy sampling.[12] Whenever $\mathcal{B}$ initiates a new instance of $\mathcal{A}'$ with input $(\mathbb{G}, p, g, \mathsf{pk})$, $\mathcal{M}$ simulates each step of $\mathcal{A}'$ as follows.

[12] The lazy sampling of F_1 is done implicitly while maintaining curInst.

1. Same as $\mathcal{A}$.
2. Same as $\mathcal{A}$ except R^* is computed as follows. Denote the current context as $\mathsf{cntx} \leftarrow (\mathsf{pk}, \{R_i, S_i\}_{i\in[n]})$. If $\mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}) = \bot$, $\mathcal{M}$ initializes $\mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx})$ with a new instance tuple consisting of
   - Id, the index of the context. Initially, $\mathcal{M}$ increase cnt by 1 and sets $\mathsf{Id} \leftarrow \mathsf{cnt}$, where cnt is a counter maintained by $\mathcal{M}$ initially set to 0.
   - R, the group element R^* under the context. Initailly, $\mathcal{M}$ sets $\mathsf{R} \leftarrow \textsc{Chal}()$.
   - ST, a map that records the discrete logarithm of (R_i, S_i) for each i and is initially set to empty.
   - PriFg, an entry records the prior forgery under the context if any.
   - sk, an entry records the extracted secret key of pk satisfying $\mathsf{pk} = g^{\mathsf{sk}}$ if any.

   Then, $\mathcal{M}$ sets $R^* \leftarrow \mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{R}$.
3. Same as $\mathcal{A}$ except $\mathcal{M}$ sets $\mathsf{CS} \leftarrow \mathsf{T}_2(c^*)$. In particular, if $\mathsf{T}_2(c^*) = \bot$, $\mathcal{M}$ first samples $\mathsf{T}_2(c^*) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \{T \subseteq [n] : |T| = t-1\}$ and then sets $\mathsf{CS} \leftarrow \mathsf{T}_2(c^*)$. In addition, $\mathcal{M}$ records $\mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{ST}(i) \leftarrow (r_i, s_i)$ for each $i \in \mathsf{CS}$.
4. Same as $\mathcal{A}$.
5. If $\mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{PriFg} = \bot$, since $\mathcal{B}$ is algebraic, $\mathcal{M}$ knows a representation of pk using all the existing OMDL challenges and thus $\mathcal{M}$ can compute $z^* \leftarrow \mathrm{DLog}_g(R^*\mathsf{pk}^{c^*})$ using a single DLog query. Then, $\mathcal{M}$ records the forgery as $\mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{PriFg} \leftarrow (c^*, z^*)$. Otherwise, $\mathcal{M}$ retrieves $(\bar{c}, \bar{z}) \leftarrow \mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx})$. If $\bar{c} = c^*$, then $\mathcal{M}$ sets $z^* \leftarrow \bar{z}$. Otherwise, $\mathcal{M}$ either retrieves the corresponding secret key of pk from the record as $\mathsf{sk} \leftarrow \mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{sk}$ or computes it as follows.
   - $\mathcal{M}$ finds $i \in [n]\backslash\mathsf{CS}$ such that $\mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{ST}(i) \neq \bot$ and retrieves $(r_i, s_i) \leftarrow \mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{ST}(i)$. $\mathcal{M}$ **aborts** if such i does not exist.
   - Since $g^{\bar{z}^{(i)}} = R_i S_i^{b^{(i)}} \mathsf{pk}^{c^{(i)}}$,[13] $\mathcal{M}$ computes $\mathsf{sk} \leftarrow (\bar{z}^{(i)} - r_i - b^{(i)} s_i)/c^{(i)}$ and sets $\mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{sk} \leftarrow \mathsf{sk}$.

   Then, since $g^{\bar{z}} = R^*\mathsf{pk}^{\bar{c}}$, $\mathcal{M}$ computes $z^* \leftarrow \bar{z} + (c^* - \bar{c}) \cdot \mathsf{sk}$. Finally, $\mathcal{M}$ outputs $(\mu^*, (R^*, z^*))$.

After $\mathcal{B}$ returns, denote ℓ as the number of challenges queried by $\mathcal{B}$. If $\mathcal{B}$ outputs the discrete logarithm to the base g of $X_1, \ldots, X_\ell$, i.e, $\mathcal{B}$ wins the AOMDL game simulated by $\mathcal{M}$, $\mathcal{M}$ computes the discrete logarithms of $\{X_{-i}\}$ as follows. Note that for each context cntx, $\mathcal{M}$ obtains exactly one challenge X_{-i} with $i = \mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{Id}$, and the total number of challenges queried by $\mathcal{M}$ is cnt. For $i \in [\mathsf{cnt}]$, suppose $\mathcal{M}$ have computed the discrete logarithm of $X_{-1}, \ldots, X_{-(i-1)}$ to the base g. $\mathcal{M}$ retrieves the $\mathsf{cntx} = (\mathsf{pk}, \{R_i, S_i\}_{i\in[n]})$ such that $\mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{Id} = i$. If $\mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{PriFg} = \bot$, $\mathcal{M}$ obtains the discrete logarithm of X_{-i} to the base g by querying the oracle DLog. Otherwise, since when pk was received, $(X_{-i}, \ldots, X_{-\mathsf{cnt}})$ were not queried, $\mathcal{B}$ provides a representation of pk using only $X_1, \ldots, X_\ell$ and $X_{-1}, \ldots X_{-(i-1)}$. Therefore, $\mathcal{M}$ can compute the discrete logarithm sk of pk to the base g. Then, $\mathcal{M}$ retrieves $(\bar{z}, \bar{c}) \leftarrow \mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{PriFg}$, which satisfies $g^{\bar{z}} = X_i \mathsf{pk}^{\bar{c}}$, and computes the discrete logarithm of X_{-i} to the base g as $x_{-i} \leftarrow \bar{z} - \bar{c} \cdot \mathsf{sk}$.

Analysis of $\mathcal{M}$. We show that (1) if $\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{A}'}$ wins the AOMDL game simulated by $\mathcal{M}$ and $\mathcal{M}$ does not abort, then $\mathcal{M}$ wins the AOMDL game; (2) $\mathcal{M}$ aborts with negligible probability.

For (1), it is clear that $\mathcal{M}$ computes the discrete logarithms of all the challenges to the base g. It is left to show that the number of DLog queries is less than $\ell + \mathsf{cnt}$. Since $\mathcal{B}$ wins the AOMDL game simulated by $\mathcal{M}$, the number of DLog queries made by $\mathcal{B}$ is less than ℓ. Also, for each $i \in [\mathsf{cnt}]$

[13] Note that $\bar{z}^{(i)}$ is computed in step 4.

and the corresponding context cntx satisfying $\mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{Id} = i$, if $\mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{PriFg} = \perp$, then $\mathcal{M}$ made no DLog query during the simulation of the instances of $\mathcal{A}'$ with the context cntx and made one DLog query when $\mathcal{M}$ computed x_{-i}. Otherwise, $\mathcal{M}$ made one DLog query during the simulation of the instances of $\mathcal{A}'$ with the context cntx and made no DLog query when $\mathcal{M}$ computed x_{-i}. Therefore, the total number of DLog queries made by $\mathcal{M}$ is less than $\ell + \mathsf{cnt}$. Also, since $\mathcal{A}'$ behaves exactly the same as $\mathcal{A}^{\rho}$ for ρ randomly sampled from Γ if $\mathcal{M}$ does not abort,

$$\begin{aligned}\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{aomdl}}_{\mathsf{GGen}}(\mathcal{M}, \kappa) &\geqslant \mathsf{Pr}[\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{A}'} \text{ wins } \wedge \ \mathcal{M} \text{ not aborts}] \\ &\geqslant \mathsf{Pr}_{\rho \leftarrow\$ \Gamma}[\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{A}^{\rho}} \text{ wins}] - \mathsf{Pr}[\mathcal{M} \text{ aborts}] \\ &= \mathsf{E}_{\rho \leftarrow\$ \Gamma}[\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{aomdl}}_{\mathsf{GGen}}(\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{A}^{\rho}}, \kappa)] - \mathsf{Pr}[\mathcal{M} \text{ aborts}] \ .\end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

To show (2), since $\mathcal{M}$ aborts only in step 5 and only if $\mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{PriFg} \neq \perp$, let us consider the simulation of any instance of $\mathcal{A}'$ with context cntx such that $\mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{PriFg} \neq \perp$. Denote $(\bar{z}, \bar{c}) \leftarrow \mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{PriFg}$. Then, there exists a prior instance of $\mathcal{A}'$ with the same context cntx that proceeded to step 5 and generated the forgery $(\bar{z}, \bar{c})$. Denote CS' as the set of corrupted signers during the prior instance. By the simulation, we know $\mathrm{curInst}(\mathsf{cntx}).\mathsf{ST}(i) \neq \perp$ for each $i \in \mathsf{CS}'$. Therefore, $\mathcal{M}$ does not abort if $\bar{c} = c^*$ or $\mathsf{CS}' \backslash \mathsf{CS} \neq \emptyset$, where CS denotes the corrupted set computed in step 3 of the current instance. Since both CS and CS' have size $t-1$, $\mathcal{M}$ aborts only if $\bar{c} \neq c^*$ and $\mathsf{CS} = \mathsf{CS}'$. Since $\mathsf{T}_2(\bar{c})$ and $\mathsf{T}_2(c^*)$ are independently sampled uniformly from $\{T \subseteq [n] : |T| = t-1\}$, the probability that $\mathsf{T}_2(\bar{c}) = \mathsf{T}_2(c^*)$ is at most $1/\binom{n}{t-1}$. Therefore, $\mathsf{Pr}[\mathcal{M} \text{ aborts}] \leqslant \mathsf{q}/\binom{n}{t-1}$, where q denotes the number of invocation of $\mathcal{A}$ by $\mathcal{B}$. Thus, combining with Equation (6), we can conclude the theorem.

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A Deferred game figures

Game $\mathbf{G}_0^{\mathcal{A}}(\kappa)$:

$par \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\kappa)$; $\mathrm{H} \leftarrow ()$
$\mathsf{HS} \leftarrow [n]$; $\mathsf{CS} \leftarrow \varnothing$
$\mathrm{S} \leftarrow \varnothing$; $\mathrm{curSS} \leftarrow ()$; $\mathrm{curLR} \leftarrow \varnothing$
$\widehat{\mathsf{sk}} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_p$; $\mathsf{pk} \leftarrow g^{\widehat{\mathsf{sk}}}$
For $(i,j) \in [n] \times [n]$ do
  $\mathsf{seed}_{i,j} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \{0,1\}^\kappa$
$\boldsymbol{a}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{a}_{t-1} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_p$
For $i \in [n]$ do
  $\mathsf{ss}_i \leftarrow \widehat{\mathsf{sk}} + \sum_{j=1}^{t-1} \boldsymbol{a}_j i^j$
  $\mathsf{st}_i.\mathsf{sk} \leftarrow (\mathsf{ss}_i, (\mathsf{seed}_{i,j}, \mathsf{seed}_{j,i})_{j\in[n]})$
$(\mu, sig) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\textsc{Cor},\mathrm{PPO},\textsc{PSign}\mathrm{O},\mathrm{RO}}(\mathsf{pk})$
If $\exists\ lr \in \mathrm{curLR} : lr.\mathsf{msg} = \mu$
  $\wedge\ lr.\mathsf{SS} \cap \mathsf{HS} \subseteq \mathrm{curSS}(lr)$ then
  Return 0
Return $(\mu \notin \mathrm{S}\ \wedge\ \mathsf{Vf}(\mathsf{pk}, \mu, sig) = 1)$

Oracle $\textsc{Cor}(i)$:

Require: $i \in \mathsf{HS}$ and $|\mathsf{CS}| < t-1$
$\mathsf{CS} \leftarrow \mathsf{CS} \backslash \{i\}$
$\mathsf{HS} \leftarrow [n] \backslash \mathsf{CS}$
Return st_i

Oracle $\mathrm{RO}(x)$:

If $\mathrm{H}(x) = \bot$ then
  $\mathrm{H}(x) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$
Return $\mathrm{H}(x)$

Oracle $\mathrm{PPO}(i)$:

Require: $i \in \mathsf{HS}$
$r, s \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_p$ $R \leftarrow g^r$; $S \leftarrow g^s$
$pp \leftarrow (R, S)$
$\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(pp) \leftarrow (r, s)$
Return (pp, st_i)

Oracle $\textsc{PSign}\mathrm{O}(i, lr)$:

Require: $lr.\mathsf{SS} \subseteq [n]\ \wedge\ i \in \mathsf{HS} \cap lr.\mathsf{SS}$
  $\wedge\ |lr.\mathsf{SS}| \geqslant t$
$pp_i \leftarrow lr.\mathsf{PP}(i)$
If $\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(pp_i) = \bot$ then return $(\bot, \mathsf{st}_i)$
If $\mathrm{curSS}(lr) = \bot$ then
  $\mathrm{curSS}(lr) \leftarrow \{i\}$
Else $\mathrm{curSS}(lr) \leftarrow \mathrm{curSS}(lr) \cup \{i\}$
If $lr \notin \mathrm{curLR}$ then
  $\mathrm{curLR} \leftarrow \mathrm{curLR} \cup \{lr\}$
// Generating the partial signature
$(r, s) \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(pp_i)$
$\mathsf{st}_i.\mathrm{mapPP}(pp_i) \leftarrow \bot$
$(R, c, b) \leftarrow \mathsf{CompPar}(\mathsf{st}_i.\mathsf{pk}, lr)$
$(\mathsf{ss}_i, (\mathsf{seed}_{i,j}, \mathsf{seed}_{j,i})_{j\in[n]}) \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_i.\mathsf{sk}$
$\mathsf{mask} \leftarrow \sum_{j \in lr.SS} \mathrm{RO}(\texttt{'m'}, \mathsf{seed}_{i,j}, (\mathsf{pk}, lr))$
  $- \sum_{j \in lr.SS} \mathrm{RO}(\texttt{'m'}, \mathsf{seed}_{j,i}, (\mathsf{pk}, lr))$
$z \leftarrow r + bs + cL_i^{lr.\mathsf{SS}}\mathsf{ss}_i + \mathsf{mask}$
Return (z, st_i)

Fig. 7. The game $\mathbf{G}_0$.




Fig. 8. The PSIGNO oracle of the games $\mathbf{G}_1$, $\mathbf{G}_2$, where $\mathbf{G}_1$ only contains dashed boxes, $\mathbf{G}_2$ only contains solid boxes. The rest of $\mathbf{G}_1$ and $\mathbf{G}_2$ is identical to $\mathbf{G}_0$.

Game $\boxed{\mathbf{G}_2^{\mathcal{A}}(\kappa)}$, $\boxed{\mathbf{G}_3^{\mathcal{A}}(\kappa)}$:

Oracle $\textsc{Cor}(i)$:

Require: $i \in \mathsf{HS}$ and $|\mathsf{CS}| < t-1$

$\mathsf{CS} \leftarrow \mathsf{CS} \backslash \{i\}$; $\mathsf{HS} \leftarrow [n] \backslash \mathsf{CS}$

For $lr \in \text{curLR} : i \in lr.\mathsf{SS}$ do

  $\mathsf{hon} \leftarrow \mathsf{HS} \cap lr.\mathsf{SS}$

  Pick arbitrary $\hat{i} \in \mathsf{hon}$

  $\mathrm{H}_m(\mathsf{seed}_{i,\hat{i}}, \mathsf{pk}, lr) \leftarrow \mathsf{mask}_{lr,i} - \sum_{j \in lr.SS \backslash \{\hat{i}\}} \mathrm{RO}(\texttt{'m'}, \mathsf{seed}_{i,j}, \mathsf{pk}, lr) + \sum_{j \in lr.SS} \mathrm{RO}(\texttt{'m'}, \mathsf{seed}_{j,i}, \mathsf{pk}, lr)$

Return st_i

Oracle $\textsc{PSignO}(i, lr)$:

Require: $lr.\mathsf{SS} \subseteq [n] \ \wedge \ i \in \mathsf{HS} \cap lr.\mathsf{SS} \ \wedge \ |lr.\mathsf{SS}| \geqslant t$

$pp_i \leftarrow lr.\mathsf{PP}(i)$

If $\mathsf{st}_i.\text{mapPP}(pp_i) = \perp$ then return $(\perp, \mathsf{st}_i)$

If $\text{curSS}(lr) = \perp$ then $\text{curSS}(lr) \leftarrow \{i\}$

Else $\text{curSS}(lr) \leftarrow \text{curSS}(lr) \cup \{i\}$

If $lr \notin \text{curLR}$ then *// new lr*

  $\text{curLR} \leftarrow \text{curLR} \cup \{lr\}$; $\mathsf{hon} \leftarrow \mathsf{HS} \cap lr.\mathsf{SS}$

  Pick arbitrary $\hat{j} \in \mathsf{hon}$

  For $j \in \mathsf{hon} \backslash \{\hat{j}\}$ do *// Compute the masks of honest signers except $\hat{j}$*

    $(\mathsf{ss}_j, (\mathsf{seed}_{j,j}, \mathsf{seed}_{j',j})_{j' \in [n]}) \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_j.\mathsf{sk}$

    $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,j} \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathbb{Z}_p$

    $\mathrm{H}_m(\mathsf{seed}_{j,\hat{j}}, \mathsf{pk}, lr) \leftarrow \mathsf{mask}_{lr,j} - \sum_{j' \in lr.SS \backslash \{\hat{j}\}} \mathrm{RO}(\texttt{'m'}, \mathsf{seed}_{j,j'}, \mathsf{pk}, lr) + \sum_{j' \in lr.SS} \mathrm{RO}(\texttt{'m'}, \mathsf{seed}_{j',j}, \mathsf{pk}, lr)$

  For $j \in lr.\mathsf{SS} \backslash \mathsf{hon}$ do *// Compute the masks of corrupted signers*

    $(\mathsf{ss}_j, (\mathsf{seed}_{j,j}, \mathsf{seed}_{j',j})_{j' \in [n]}) \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_j.\mathsf{sk}$

    $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,j} \leftarrow \sum_{j' \in lr.SS} (\mathrm{RO}(\texttt{'m'}, \mathsf{seed}_{j,j'}, \mathsf{pk}, lr) - \mathrm{RO}(\texttt{'m'}, \mathsf{seed}_{j',j}, \mathsf{pk}, lr))$

  $\mathsf{mask}_{lr,\hat{j}} \leftarrow -\sum_{j \in lr.\mathsf{SS} \backslash \{\hat{j}\}} \mathsf{mask}_{lr,j}$ *// Compute the mask for signer $\hat{j}$*

// Compute the partial signature

$(r, s) \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_i.\text{mapPP}(pp_i)$; $\mathsf{st}_i.\text{mapPP}(pp_i) \leftarrow \perp$

$(R, c, b) \leftarrow \mathsf{CompPar}(\mathsf{st}_i.\mathsf{pk}, lr)$

$(\mathsf{ss}_i, (\mathsf{seed}_{i,j}, \mathsf{seed}_{j,i})_{j \in [n]}) \leftarrow \mathsf{st}_i.\mathsf{sk}$

$z \leftarrow r + bs + cL_i^{lr.\mathsf{SS}} \mathsf{ss}_i + \mathsf{mask}_{lr,i}$

Return z

Fig. 9. The PSignO and Cor oracles of the games $\mathbf{G}_2$ and $\mathbf{G}_3$, where $\mathbf{G}_2$ only contains dashed boxes and $\mathbf{G}_3$ only contains solid boxes. The rest of $\mathbf{G}_3$ is identical to $\mathbf{G}_2$.




Fig. 10. The PSIGNO oracle of the games $\mathbf{G}_3$ and $\mathbf{G}_4$, where $\mathbf{G}_3$ only contains dashed boxes and $\mathbf{G}_4$ only contains solid boxes. The algorithm SampleMask is defined in Figure 11. The rest of $\mathbf{G}_4$ is identical to $\mathbf{G}_3$.




Fig. 11. The PSignO oracle and the SampleMask algorithm of the games $\mathbf{G}_4$, $\mathbf{G}_5$, where $\mathbf{G}_4$ only contains dashed boxes and $\mathbf{G}_5$ only contains solid boxes. The rest of $\mathbf{G}_5$ is identical to $\mathbf{G}_4$.




Fig. 12. The COR oracle and the SampleMask algorithm of the games $\mathbf{G}_5$, $\mathbf{G}_6$ and $\mathbf{G}_7$, where $\mathbf{G}_5$ only contains dashed boxes, $\mathbf{G}_6$ only contains highlighted boxes, and $\mathbf{G}_7$ only contains solid boxes. The rest of $\mathbf{G}_6$ and $\mathbf{G}_7$ is identical to $\mathbf{G}_5$.